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ABSTRACT 
A THUMB ON THE SCALE: 
BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM AND THE ESSAYS OF 
STEPHEN JAY GOULD 
by 
Kevin F. Ryan 
Biological determinism is a field of scientific theory that attributes human behavior, 
relationships, and social structures predominantly to hereditary and biological rather 
than cultural and environmental influences. In almost twenty-five years of published 
essays, the Harvard evolutionary biologist, Stephen Jay Gould, has sounded an alarm 
that biological determinism—through its scientific rationalization of slavery, eugenic 
sterilization, Nazi atrocity, and more subtle forms of injustice 	perennially poses a real 
and dangerous threat to humanity. This thesis explores the career-long anti-hereditarian 
thread permeating Gould's published works on evolutionary history and the history 
of science. Gould's assertions regarding the cultural embeddedness of science are 
emphasized—as well as his view that the human species' role within the "big picture" 
of geological time and space is often dangerously misinterpreted. His alternative view, 
biological potentialism, is presented and defended. 
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[The Mismeasure of Man] is not really a serious book. It is merely a Marxist 
polemic.. . . Ordinarily a book this loaded with errors is just ignored. Why not 
this one? Because its author is a popular and influential writer, and this book has 
had a major impact on the public. Its first edition sold 125,000 copies. It has been 
lavishly praised by literary publications like the New York Review of Books. . . . 
So a lot of people not only accepted it but loved it. Why? I think the reason is that 
it panders to what people want to believe. 
Frank Schmidt, in Personnel Psychology 
Gould uses evolutionary theory to argue not for racial superiority, of course, but 
for racial equality. This might seem surprising on its face. If anything, evolution 
predicts differentiation. Not even in Animal Farm, and surely not in Darwin's 
theory, do all animals end up equal. Gould makes fun of his predecessors for 
drawing the (plausible) inference of inequality from evolution and proceeds to 
draw a most implausible one himself. The hare might beat the tortoise, or the 
tortoise the hare, but it would be irrational to predict a dead heat between the two. 
Still, Gould treats evolution with such a proprietary air that he seems to feel he can 
make it come out any way he wants 	including dead heats where needed. 
Tom Bethel, in American Spectator 
These are harsher criticisms than might ordinarily be expected about someone whose 
ostensible field has been simply the study and teaching of paleontology. They are written 
about Stephen Jay Gould, professor of paleozoology at Harvard University. If it were 
possible to read the between the lines and distill a meta-message from these comments, 
one might conclude that some element of Gould's work has struck a nerve in these critics. 
That element may well have been Gould's twenty-five-year offensive against biological 
determinism—the lingering and insidious misapplication of biological science as 
justification for inequities in social systems. 
Biological determinism is a field of scientific theory which attributes human 
behavior, human relationships (both within our species and with other species), and 
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persisting social structures predominantly to biological rather than cultural or 
environmental influences. 
The subject of this thesis is the career-long thread of anti-biological-determinist 
argument in Stephen Jay Gould's published works. His topics have included the 
nineteenth-century theory of polygenism (which cast races as separate species, and was 
employed to rationalize slavery) and the application of mental testing to immigration 
restriction, eugenic sterilization of the mentally retarded, and socioeconomic planning. 
In all, his ongoing goal seems to be the inoculation of the lay audience against passive 
acceptance of what can seem a powerfully intimidating force: the "scientifically proven," 
monolithically unalterable "fact of nature." Gould believes that lay people need better 
information to perceive the social ramifications of biological determinism (which is also 
known as hereditarianism). 
In addition to academic research and teaching in geology, paleontology, and the 
history of science, Gould has contributed a monthly essay, "This View of Life," to 
Natural History magazine since 1974. By 1999 he had contributed over 200 essays to 
this column, which he expects to discontinue in the year 2000. Gould has gained a mass 
popular audience with this prolific and uninterrupted string of essays, with a series of 
collections repackaging them in book form, and with original book-length works. 
Although, as with his book, Ontogeny and Phylogeny (1977), he has written for 
audiences of scientific peers, his authorial success has derived chiefly from popular 
essay collections that include Ever Since Darwin (1977), The Panda's Thumb (1980), 
The Flamingo's Smile (1985), and Bully for Brontosaurus (1991). His most celebrated 
popular work and indeed his most avowedly anti-hereditarian effort, The Mismeasure of 
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Man (1981), has been named one of the one hundred best non-fiction books of the 
century by a Random House panel. He has won the National Book Award, The National 
Book Critics Circle Award, the Phi Beta Kappa Science Award, and the MacArthur 
award. 
Ironically, it is Gould's very popularity that is often cited by critics attempting to 
dismiss his credibility. How can a scientist / author remain faithful to the technical 
nuances of his discipline, they argue, while writing for a popular audience? And yet as a 
prolific essayist Gould consistently avows just such a goal 	the goal of writing with 
respect for the intellect of the perceptive lay person. In a secular era when credulous awe 
of the mysteries of religion is frequently dismissed and supplanted by a sometimes 
equally credulous deference to the mysteries of science, Gould seems to view himself as 
a clarifying advocate for the informed consumption of bioscientific information. His 
goal: informing a general public all too easily manipulated and enlisted by pseudo-
technical obfuscation. 
Stephen Jay Gould was born in 1941 in Queens, New York. His decision to 
become a paleontologist occurred at the age of five on a visit with his father to New 
York's American Museum of Natural History. After completing undergraduate work at 
Antioch College, Gould earned his doctorate in paleontology from Columbia University 
in 1967, and began his long affiliation with Harvard University that same year as an 
assistant professor of geology. He became a full professor by 1973 and later the Curator 
of Invertebrate Paleontology at the Harvard Museum of Comparative Zoology. An 
authority on West Indian snail species, Gould was also recognized in 1972 (with collabo-
rator Niles Eldredge) for introducing the evolutionary theory of punctuated equilibrium, 
which described evolutionary history as long periods of stasis separated by sudden 
intervals of major change. This contrasts with the long-held theory that evolutionary 
change is slow and gradual. Among numerous career honors, Gould is the current 
president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. 
An ardent scholar of evolutionary theory, Gould has imbued his essays with a 
scientific historian's subtle sensitivity to the real-world contexts and consequences of 
Darwinism and of other important biological and geological theories. He is an unabashed 
celebrant of science as an important, affirming, and immensely creative human activity. 
Indeed, much of Gould's appeal may stern from the multi-faceted "Renaissance Man" 
ethos that permeates his essays. Gould's ability to present technical concepts interest-
ingly to a popular audience seems to derive from deliberate attention to readers' non-
scientific realms of interest. Instead of presenting science in a dryly technical "just the 
facts" style, Gould establishes interest and relevance for science through allusions to 
historical and political contexts, art, the literature of Mary Shelley and James Joyce, 
philosophical theory, music, and baseball. 
Relatedly, the cultural embeddedness of science is one of Gould's recurrent themes. 
Gould rejects two common opposing views of science: 1) science as an impassive and 
mechanical processor of objectively acquired facts, and 2) science as a sequence of 
purely isolated "Eureka!" events entirely encompassed within the creativity of the 
scientists. Instead, Gould welcomes the admission that the cultural context of science is 
integral to its own identity, while cautioning about the social ramifications of this inter-
relatedness: 
Science is no inexorable march to truth mediated by the collection of objective 
information and the destruction of ancient superstition. Scientists, as ordinary 
human beings, unconsciously reflect in their theories the social and political 
constraints of their times. As privileged members of society, more often than not 
they end up defending existing social arrangements as biologically foreordained. 
(Ever Since 15) 
To him, a true scientist loses no credibility in the admission of his or her own cultural 
influences. Only in the obfuscation of the relationship does Gould see danger. He sees 
biology and culture as "interpenetrating opposites" best interpreted by a dialectical I 
synthetic approach (Urchin 153). 
Gould's dyed-in-the-wool anti-hereditarianism did not arise in a vacuum. His 
arguments against biological determinism advance a torch carried by the American 
journalist Walter Lippman in the second decade of this century, by the Swedish 
sociologist Gunnar Myrdal in the 1940s, by the author Ashley Montagu in the 1950s, 
and by contemporary allies such as Northeastern University psychologist, Leon Kamin. 
In respect for his venerable antecedent, Gould praises Gunnar Myrdal's 1944 book, An 
American Dilemma, for its stand against scientific racism. Gould uses the following 
quote from Myrdal's book to support his own concern that many cultural biases are 
buried so deeply as to be unrecognizable: 
But there must be countless errors of the same sort that no living man can yet 
detect, because of the fog within which our type of Western culture envelops us. 
Cultural influences have set up the assumptions about the mind, the body, and the 
universe with which we begin; pose the questions we ask; influence the facts we 
seek; determine the interpretation we give these facts and direct our reaction to 
these interpretations and conclusions. (qtd. in Urchin 216) 
To Gould, the history of science is rich with (often ulterior) social implications, 
implications he has explored in his essays for a quarter of a century. To this exploration 
he has applied his distinguishing gifts as a writer: his breadth of knowledge, the clarity 
and readability of his work, his ability to enliven the history of science through his multi- 
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faceted "Renaissance Man" pedagogy, and the credibility that comes from wide 
recognition of his work. 
The argument between advocates of biological determinism, opposing advocates 
of pure environmentalism, and outspoken moderates like Gould is often heated. It has 
inflamed social and political polarization at many levels. Although often cast as an 
extremist by critics, Gould supports what can be considered the hybrid theory of 
"biological potentialism," which embraces both hereditary and environmental influences 
in the determination of human behavior, achievement, and social structures. Theoretical 
moderation notwithstanding, the argument against pure, "high-potency" hereditarianism 




FOCUSSING ON BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 
2.1 	The Nature of Biological Determinism 
Biological determinism is a set of theories used to explain human social and political 
behaviors and institutions as the inevitable consequences of natural biological laws. 
The archetypal biological determinist statement contends that one race, class, or subgroup 
of humans is biologically (and, therefore, inevitably) superior to another. To Gould, 
biological determinist ideas garner strong appeal among individuals occupying favored 
positions within their societies. He argues that 
appeals to innate biology for the explanation of human behavior have often been 
advanced in the name of enlightenment. The proponents of biological determinism 
argue that science can cut through the web of superstition and sentimentalism to 
instruct us about our true nature. But their claims have usually had a different 
primary effect. They are used by the leaders of class-stratified societies to assert 
that a current social order must prevail because it is the law of nature. . . . (Ever 
Since 223) 
To biological determinist theorists, nature proscribes an essentially inevitable and 
unalterable character to human behavior, achievement, and social status. On human 
intelligence, for example, the early twentieth-century determinist, Henry Goddard, wrote: 
Stated in its boldest form our thesis is that the chief determiner of human 
conduct is a unitary mental process which we call intelligence: that this process is 
conditioned by a nervous mechanism that is inborn: that the degree of efficiency to 
be attained by that nervous mechanism and the consequent grade of intelligence or 
mental level for each individual is determined by the kind of chromosomes that 
come together with the union of the germ cells: that it is but little affected by any 
later influence except such serious accidents as may destroy part of the mechanism. 
As a consequence any attempt at social adjustment which fails to take into 
account the determining character of the intelligence and its unalterable grade in 
each individual is illogical and inefficient. (1) 
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To Stephen Jay Gould, however, human behavior and social status—although undeniably 
influenced to some extent by biology—are in significant part sociocultural constructs for 
which biological determinism serves as a powerfully homeostatic rationalization. 
After the publication of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species in 1859, biological 
determinism as a driving social theory gained widespread support. Science-based 
rationalizations for racism increased sharply. They did so largely through the determinis-
tically rich concept of recapitulation, which propounded that "ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny." More simply put, recapitulation contended that the embryological, infantile, 
and juvenile stages of human development (human ontogeny) reenact the evolutionary 
stages through which the human species evolved from ancestral species. According to 
the theory, contemporary human juveniles resemble ancestral primate adults. In Onto-
geny and Phylogeny (1977), Gould examined for an audience of his peers the history and 
hereditarian ramifications of recapitulation theory. 
Writing on a more formal, scholarly level than that of the more popular works 
that would follow, Gould laid the groundwork in Ontogeny and Phylogeny for anti-
hereditarian arguments that were to recur frequently throughout his subsequent work. 
These arguments emphasize culture's influence upon science, the continuing lack of 
corroborating data for determinist contentions, and the ever-present a priori conclusion—
the subconscious bias or intentional "thumb-on-the-scale" prejudice that can make 
science anything but objective. Gould wrote "the sway of biological determinism, the 
lack of sensitivity to environmental influence, and the blatant desire to crown one's own 
group as biologically superior are quite characteristic of the time 	and scarcely extinct 
today" (Ontogeny 130). 
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One early and influential recapitulationist was the German biologist, Ernst Haeckel. 
A contemporary of Darwin's and a fervent promoter of Darwinism in his own country, 
Haeckel postulated that the gill-like slits in human embryos represent the gills of 
ancestral adult fishes. Haeckel believed strongly in the inheritance of acquired traits 
(Lamarckianism) through terminal addition, which theorized a progressive incrementing 
of the number of sequential traits reenacted in the embryo-to-adult development process 
as new species evolved from existing species. For humans, as more and more advanced 
traits were added to the end of our evolving ancestors' hypothesized embryo-to-adult 
developmental sequences, the amount of time spent by individuals reenacting the earlier 
phases would necessarily "condense" to accommodate the increased number of traits. 
This ensured that the ever-increasing number of developmental stages would still be 
completed by the time the juvenile entered adulthood. 
Gould contends that "recapitulation intruded itself into every subject that offered 
even the remotest possibility of a connection between children of 'higher' races and the 
persistent habits of 'adult savages' (Ontogeny 117). Mainstream scientists 	not a fringe 
group of crackpots 	seemed eager to contribute to the recapitulation movement. Carl 
Vogt, a respected German anatomist, wrote in 1864: 
The grown-up Negro partakes, as regards his intellectual faculties, of the nature of 
the child, the female, and the senile white. . . . Some tribes have founded states, 
possessing a peculiar organization; but, as to the rest, we may boldly assert that the 
whole race has, neither in the past nor the present, performed anything tending to 
the progress of humanity or worthy of preservation. (qtd. in Gould, Ontogeny 130) 
With statements like this one epitomizing the expressed sentiments of many mainstream 
scientists after 1860, Gould asserts that evolutionary theory "quickly became the primary 
weapon for many efforts in social change" (Ontogeny 120). 
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Recapitulationism's race-conscious orientation was epitomized in the words of 
Harvard's widely respected Swiss-born naturalist, Louis Agassiz (1807-1873), who stated 
that "the brain of the Negro is that of the imperfect brain of a seven month's infant in the 
womb of the White" (qtd. in Gould, Ontogeny 127). The British polymath, Herbert 
Spencer (1820-1903), echoed this sentiment in 1895: "The intellectual traits of the 
uncivilized are traits recurring in the children of the civilized" (qtd. in Gould, Ontogeny 
128). 
An example of applied recapitulationism lay in the work of Italian physician, 
Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909), who with his theories of "criminal anthropology" 
attempted to construct a scientific method for segregating criminals and underachievers 
from the general population. Lombroso's theories descended from Franz Joseph Gall's 
early nineteenth-century theory of phrenology, which attributed mental attributes to 
localized and palpable physiognomic skull features. In 1909, looking back at his career, 
Lombroso wrote of the personal epiphany wherein, by examining one offender's skull, he 
discovered the connection between atavistic physical features and criminal tendencies: 
This was not merely an idea, but a revelation. At the sight of that skull, I 
seemed to see all of a sudden, lighted up as a vast plain under a flaming sky, the 
problem of the nature of the criminal—an atavistic being who reproduces in his 
person the ferocious instincts of primitive humanity and the inferior animals. Thus 
were explained anatomically the enormous jaws, high cheek-bones, prominent 
superciliary arches, solitary lines in the palms, extreme size of the orbits, handle-
shaped or sessile ears found in criminals, savages, and apes, insensibility to pain, 
extremely acute sight, tattooing, excessive idleness, love of orgies, and the irresis-
tible craving for evil for its own sake, the desire not only to extinguish life in the 
victim, but to mutilate the corpse, tear its flesh, and drink its blood. (xxv) 
Relying heavily on the interpretation of physical appearance, Lombroso's theory lent 
credence to an intuition that every schoolyard bully, Wild West vigilante, and road-rage-
ready motorist might support: that one can tell by appearance alone that certain people 
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are "unsavory criminal types." The concept resembles today's controversial law 
enforcement practice of racial profiling, an apparently abused but arguably not-
altogether-indefensible police practice of selecting potential suspects based on criminal 
race demographics (Kennedy). 
Lombroso believed that criminals were biologically inferior to evolutionarily 
advanced, law-abiding, morally upright people. He believed that a significant percentage 
of criminality was inherited and that certain "born criminals" represented a lower stage in 
human evolution. Children, lower animals, and criminal adults represented primitive, 
lawless phases along the phylogenetic and ontogenetic path to adult morality and 
lawfulness. Criminals possessed physical traits Lombroso called "stigmata," which, to a 
trained eye, could clearly identify a person's past, present, and potential criminality. 
Stigmata betraying criminal proclivities included such traits as long arms, low and 
narrow forehead, large ears, thick skull, large jaw, hairy chest, brown skin, tattoos, and 
decreased sensitivity to pain. 
Lombroso argued that punishments should not fit the crime as much as the 
criminal 	imposing more lenient sentences upon criminals whose actions seemed 
compelled by passion or circumstances, and harsher sentences upon "biological" 
criminals. Characterizing Lombroso's followers as self-described "enlightened 
modernists" tending towards liberal and socialist politics, Gould believes that their 
movement was tragic "because it shifted so much attention from the social basis of 
crime to fallacious ideas about the innate propensity of criminals" (Mismeasure 141). 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, with the increasing acceptance of 
Mendelian genetics and improved understanding of the mechanisms of heredity, 
Facing 12 
A juvenile and adult 
chimpanzee showing the greater 
resemblance of humans to the 
baby and illustrating the princi-
ple of neoteny in human evolu-
tion. 
Figure 2-1. Evidence of Neoteny in Chimpanzees. (Mismeasure 332) 
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recapitulation could no longer be sustained as a feasible hypothesis. The developmental 
theory that superceded it, neoteny (also called paedomorphism), was proposed in 1909 by 
W. Garstang and J. Kallman. It hypothesized that the human developmental sequence 
from embryo and fetus through infant and juvenile to adult actually represents a retarding 
and truncating of the developmental sequence followed by the ancestral species from 
which humans evolved. Humans' longer juvenile dependency—neoteny hypothesized—
shows that humans experience a prolonged period of juvenile growth not experienced by 
chimps, gorillas, and other primates. The most important consequence of this slowed 
development and prolonged growth is the development of an enlarged brain. The 
functional capabilities enabled by our more highly developed brain—determinists and 
environmentalists agree 	sets us far apart from other species on earth. Figure 2-1, 
reproduced from Gould's Mismeasure of Man, illustrates the remarkable physical 
resemblance between the juvenile chimpanzee (upright posture, vertical jaw, small and 
flat face) and the adult human, while showing that the adult chimpanzee loses these 
characteristics in subsequent growth stages unshared by humans. Among contemporary 
evolutionary biologists, neoteny still retains general support (with some zones of 
disagreement). 
Neoteny, despite its complete contradiction of recapitulation, was nonetheless 
embraced by many determinists. Gould highlights what he perceives as the complete 
reversal of determinist consensus that occurred as neoteny first gained acceptance. 
Scientists who had hitherto expended great energy gathering data to argue similarities 
between apes, the adults of "lower" races, and the children of "higher" races now were 
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attempting to prove that "higher" races were more developmentally retarded than 
"lower" races. 
One such scientist was the Dutch anatomist, Louis Bolk, who believed that 
Negroes pass through a developmental stage that has already become the final stage for 
Caucasians. In 1929 Bolk wrote that "qualitative differences in fetalization and retar-
dation are the base of racial inequality. Looked at from this point of view, the division of 
mankind into higher and lower races is fully justified. . . . The white race appears to be 
the most progressive, as being the most retarded" (qtd. in Gould, Ontogeny 358). With 
ostensible objectivity at his side, Bolk strove to validate the presumed superiority of his 
own race. 
In addition to recapitulation and neoteny, other biological determinist efforts in 
the last two centuries have aimed to rank sexes, races, and nationalities by measurable 
parameters such as skull volume, brain weight, and IQ test score. In numbers, there is a 
tangible and ineluctable power that is lacking in mere qualitative theory. "Numbers don't 
lie" is the aphorism, an aphorism with which Gould often disagrees. Many of his essays 
are devoted to criticism of scientists' numbers—the methods by which they are obtained, 
the contexts in which they are applied, and the perceptional schema through which they 
are interpreted. 
The goal of the nineteenth-century Philadelphia physician, Samuel Morton, was 
to validate polygenism scientifically, the concept that Caucasians, Negroes, and Native 
Americans represent distinctly different biological species. Morton's specialty was 
the measurement of human skull volume, which he pursued with great fervor (as his 
career collection of six hundred skulls attests). Morton measured the volumes of skulls 
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obtained worldwide. His technique was to pour mustard seeds into the skull's foramen 
magnum until the skull was full, and then to pour the seeds out into a graduated cylinder 
for precise measurement. Morton computed statistical summary data on skull volume for 
a number of racial groups, and published his comparative findings in charts such as 
Table 1-1, which appeared in his 1839 book, Crania Americana: 
Table 1-1. Summary of Internal Cranial Capacity (in cu. in.) by Race. (Morton) 
RACE N MEAN LARGEST SMALLEST 
Caucasian 52 87 109 75 
Mongolian 10 83 93 69 
Malay 18 81 89 64 
[Native] American 144 82 100 60 
Ethiopian 29 78 94 65 
Morton's book presents a methodical analysis of the races of the globe, with each 
race's chapter being organized primarily into elaborately detailed cranial description and 
sociocultural commentary. The book is exquisitely illustrated with lithographs of human 
skulls. Of the American Indian, Morton wrote: 
The intellectual faculties of the great [Native American] family appear to be of a 
decidedly inferior caste when compared with the Caucasian or Mongolian races. 
They are not only averse to the restraints of education, but for the most part 
incapable of a continued process of reasoning on abstract subjects. . . . Their 
proximity for more than two centuries to European institutions, has made scarcely 
any appreciable change in their mode of thinking or manner of life; and as to their 
own social condition, they probably resemble in most respects what they were at 
the primitive epoch of their existence.... However much the benevolent mind may 
regret the inaptitude of the Indian for civilization, the affirmation of this question 
seems to be established beyond a doubt. (81-82) 
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The book makes frequent allusions to different racial groups' apparent statuses along a 
ranked continuum of civilization and progress and is highly critical of the Negro and 
Native American capacity for social, cultural, and political achievement. 
Gould obtained access in 1977 to Morton's original skull collection and to his 
experimental notes, and considers them to be clear indicators that Morton's experiments 
were finagled attempts to create data supportive of an a priori conclusion—namely that 
Caucasian skulls were larger than those of other races. He notes in The Mismeasure of 
Man that the averages listed in the above chart are incorrect because they represent 
Morton's selective bias favoring the inclusion of certain racial subsamples over others 
(57-60). For example, Morton excluded many of his Hindu skulls (a smaller-brained 
White subsample) because reporting them would have brought the Caucasian mean 
down to 84.4. He included a disproportionately large number of Peruvian Inca skulls 
(a smaller-brained Native American subsample), which, if weighted equally along with 
other Native American subgroups, would have brought the Native American mean up to 
83.8. 
Gould found several key methodological flaws in Morton's work, including a 
failure to account for known correlations of skull size with age, sex, and body stature. 
Also, Morton's notes indicated that his measurements switched from mustard seed to lead 
shot between 1839 and 1844, and Gould observed, much to his surprise, that lead shot 
consistently gave higher and more reproducible measurements than mustard seed. Gould 
re-measured the Crania Americana skulls by the lead shot method and found that for 
Ethiopians, Native Americans, and Caucasians, the mustard seed results published by 
Morton were lower by 5.4, 2.2, and 1.8 cubic inches, respectively. To Gould, these 
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numbers represent proof that the Morton's mustard seed results were finagled con-
sciously or subconsciously to fit a preordained conclusion about racial ranking 
(Mismeasure 68). The manipulation, Gould speculates, probably consisted of tamping 
and shaking of the easily-compressible mustard seeds in order to produce the desired 
measurement. 
Another nineteenth-century biological determinist was the French professor of 
medicine, Paul Broca, who studied brain size and weight. From his observations, Broca 
asserted that the brains of upper class White men of western European extraction were 
larger than the brains of women, of other races, and of other social classes. Broca 
inferred social superiority directly from his observations, and invoked the argument— 
perennially recurrent among biological determinists 	that those social classes with 
proven lower brain measurements were incapable of significant learning, and a resource 
drain to attempt to educate. 
In The Mismeasure of Man Gould cites numerous examples of circular reasoning 
in which Broca dismissed his own observations for no apparent reason other than their 
dissonance with his a priori conclusions. For example, in addressing the argument that 
women's brains might be smaller because women's body's are smaller, Broca confuses 
hypothesis with established fact: 
We must not forget that women are, on average, a little less intelligent than men, a 
difference which we should not exaggerate but which is, nonetheless, real. We are 
therefore permitted to suppose that the relatively small size of the female brain 
depends in part upon her physical inferiority and in part upon her intellectual 
inferiority (qtd. in Gould, Mismeasure 104). 
His hypothesis (not his established fact) was that women are less intelligent as proven by 
a smaller average brain weight than men. Gould cites the contemporary South African 
anthropologist, P.V. Tobias, who argues that brain size bears no relationship to intern- 
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gence, and that any variation Broca may have observed may be attributed to differences 
in age, height, body size, nutritional level, and specimen handling (Mismeasure 111-112). 
Near the beginning of the twentieth century, proponents of biological determinism 
turned away from the concrete physical measurement of physiological structures such as 
brains and skulls. They redirected their considerable energies into the more abstract (and 
slippery) realm of psychometric testing, otherwise known as Intelligence or IQ testing. 
The goal remained the same: to paint an ostensibly incontrovertible scientific proof that 
certain groups of human beings are biologically inferior and, therefore, deserve inferior 
social, political, and economic status. 
The concept of "intelligence testing" was introduced in 1905 by the French 
psychologist, Alfred Binet. In The Mismeasure of Man, Gould paints Binet as a well-
intentioned educator whose chief motivation was the development of an effective method 
for early identification of children in need of special education services. This would 
permit those children to be given the added training that they needed to cope with the 
practical tasks of everyday living. 
Binet described his tests as measuring a cluster of important practical skills, but 
made no claim to the existence of a single measurable entity called "intelligence" 
(Lippman 562). He based his test questions on real-life, practical problems of logic, 
counting, and spatial understanding relevant to the child's ability to cope with tasks of 
everyday living. Binet did not see intelligence as a single fixed quantity, and feared that 
educators would misinterpret the utility of his tests and use them with "brutal pessimism" 
to the detriment of those children who needed help (Kamin, "Pioneers" 477). 
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Unfortunately, by Gould's account, Binet's work was often distorted and abused to 
simply isolate underachieving children, removing resources from those children most in 
need of special help. Indeed, had Binet lived beyond 1911, he would have witnessed the 
driving force of intelligence testing research and development shift quickly from his own 
altruistic motives to motives more attuned to eugenics, forced sterilization, and racial 
segregation. Binet had unintentionally sparked the hereditarian theory of IQ. 
During the second decade of this century, Henry Goddard was research director at 
New Jersey's Vineland Training School for Feeble-minded Girls and Boys. As one of 
the first to promote intelligence testing in the United States, Goddard asserted that 
intelligence was a unified mental entity that was measurable along a unilinear, rankable 
scale. The lower end of this scale was populated, in order of decreasing ability, by 
"morons," "imbeciles," and "idiots." He viewed intelligence as strictly inherited from 
generation to generation, and feared that both the immigration of foreign morons and the 
unrestricted reproduction of domestic morons jeopardized the nation's well-being. 
Intelligence studies and theories by Goddard and by the American psychologists 
Howard Yerkes of Harvard (the 1917 "Army Study"), Carl Brigham of Princeton (in the 
1920s), and Louis Terman of Stanford (between 1910 and 1935) successfully dissemi-
nated biological determinist views widely among the general public. They also helped to 
effect tangible social policy changes in the United States. 
Hereditarian arguments based on intelligence testing persist to this day and have 
generally followed the same pattern as those based on physical measurements (such as 
Broca's brains or Morton's skulls). They have interpreted test measurements as 
suggesting that inherent biological group differences exist among races, ethnicities, or 
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social classes 	and subtly or not-so-subtly advocated conservative, exclusionary social 
policy changes. From the 1960s through the present day, hereditarian theories with 
controversial social ramifications have been advanced by academics like Berkeley 
psychologist emeritus, Arthur Jensen; the American Enterprise Institute fellow, Charles 
Murray; the late Harvard psychologist, Richard Herrnstein; the British psychology 
professor, Richard Lynn; and the University of Western Ontario professor, J. P. Rushton. 
The 1994 publication of Herrnstein and Murray's popular book, The Bell Curve, is a 
strong indication of the extent to which biological determinist views are still embedded in 
the American psyche. Chapter 3, "Ideas Matter," will discuss what Gould perceives as 
the serious social ramifications of twentieth-century intelligence testing. 
2.2 	Behold—or Imagine—The Great Ladder of Progress 
But recapitulation, neoteny, and measurements of physical and mental ability are not 
the only weapons within the biological determinist arsenal. Intrinsic to the hereditarian 
ethos are distinct beliefs about the role of humans—especially particular subgroups of 
humans—within the time-space continuum of life on earth. If recapitulation, neoteny, 
skull and brain measurement, and intelligence testing could be considered the "oils" of 
biological determinism, the "great ladder of progress" can be considered its canvas. 
Or, like a musical "rest," the ladder is often as significant as the bolder elements super-
imposed on it, and often goes unrecognized in the background of thought. Seeing 
dangerous implications in subconsciously grounded assumptions, Stephen Jay Gould 
repeatedly uses his essays to call attention to and criticize our concept of progress. 
The "ladder of progress" comprises the often subliminal assumptions and beliefs 
that we as humans often harbor about our species' importance in the scheme of life on 
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earth (or, indeed, the universe). Intimately tied with both religious "creation stories" 
and with Western utilitarian philosophy—and enlisting the support of Darwinistic 
interpretations wherever plausible—the "ladder of progress" is the tacit but widely held 
species-ist opinion that humans were somehow predestined to rise above other species 
and dominate nature. By extension, it also encompasses the racially biased assumption 
that certain groups of humans have been preordained by nature to rise above other human 
groups. The ladder's chief tenet is that evolutionary history has consisted of a forward-
marching progression of life from creation to the present, with humans representing the 
preordained pinnacle of this process. The ladder is consistent with the Platonic concept 
of an essential and universal Natural Law, driving ever forward toward a preordained 
goal. 
This writer (and I suspect a majority of lay people in Western nations over several 
recent generations) took from his elementary and secondary school science training the 
notion the Darwinian evolution represented a straight line of gradual change over time. 
We had learned that bacteria evolved into amoeba, which somehow evolved into small 
multi-celled marine life, then into fishes, then amphibians, then into mammals, then into 
hominid antecedents like the Cro-Magnon. Homo sapiens evolved as the last link on this 
chain or "ladder of progress." 
But in essays collected in books such as Ever Since Darwin, The Flamingo's Smile, 
Bully for Brontosaurus, Dinosaur in a Haystack, and Wonderful Life, Gould repeatedly 
stresses his view that this is not the way evolution occurred at all. Much to our discom-
fort in considering the full implications of the statement, Gould considers evolution 
purposeless, non-progressive, and materialistic 	far from the preordained and unilinear 
21 
process it is often considered. Life on earth has evolved not as a ladder or a march, 
Gould claims, but rather in a "punctuated equilibrium" involving a rich "bush" of coeval 
species interrelated by genealogical branches and twigs. Long stretches of species stasis 
have been punctuated by sudden and geologically brief periods of rapid, unpredictable 
change, often resulting in extinctions. Gould believes that the element of chance played 
such a pivotal role that it is highly unlikely the evolutionary process could rerun to the 
same current result. 
According to Gould, the chief driving force of evolutionary change is not progress, 
but contingency and chance: "Humans are not the end result of predictable evolutionary 
progress, but rather a fortuitous cosmic afterthought, a tiny little twig on the enormously 
arborescent bush of life, which, if replanted from seed, would almost surely not grow this 
twig again, or perhaps any twig with any property that we would care to call conscious-
ness" (Dinosaur 327). As one support he cites current theories that an extraterrestrial 
body's collision with the earth was responsible for the extinction of dinosaurs, and 
contends that without this cosmic happenstance, mammals might not have risen and 
humans might not have evolved. In Wonderful Life, while describing the diversity of new 
(but now mostly extinct) multi-cellular species that arose 500 million years ago during a 
brief but critical geological period called the Cambrian Explosion, Gould comments that 
the seemingly insignificant survival of one worm-like genus at that time, Pikaia—the 
first known chordate 	was a prerequisite for human existence today. 
But what has evolutionary change to do with biological determinism? One of 
Gould's recurrent subjects is the inextricability of science from its cultural context. The 
concepts of cultural and biological progress are intertwined, according to Gould, and the 
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perception of a forward-marching progression deeply pervades the culture and ideology 
of Western civilization. In Dinosaur in a Haystack, he describes the duality of change 
versus constancy as a politically charged mental construct: "A fundamental tenet of 
Western life, at least since the late eighteenth century, has proclaimed change as natural, 
constant, and inevitable. . . . Evolution is a fact of nature 	one that could probably not 
have been perceived, and certainly not widely promulgated, before preference for change 
in this cardinal duality swept the Western world" (134). 
The utilitarian concept of progress implies the inferiority and undesirability of that 
which came before, the unspoken urge to advance and improve, and the freedom (indeed, 
even the duty) to eradicate what is perceived as imperfection. A clear example of this 
sentiment is found in this passage on Native Americans from the appendix of Samuel 
Morton's Crania Americana, written by George Combe, a lawyer and phrenology 
proponent who was Morton's friend and supporter: 
The aspect of America is still more deplorable than that of Africa. Surrounded for 
centuries by European knowledge, enterprise and energy, and incited to improve-
ment by the example of European institutions, many of the nations of that continent 
remain at the present time the same miserable, wandering, houseless and lawlesss 
savages that their ancestors were, when Columbus first set foot upon their soil. . . 
It is certainly a striking and mysterious fact that a race of men should thus have 
continued for ages stationary in a state of the rudest barbarism, that tendency to 
improvement, a principle that has been thought more than perhaps any other to 
distinguish man from the lower animals, would seem to be totally wanting in them. 
Generation after generation passes away, and no traces of advancement distinguish 
the last from the first. (272) 
Combe's repugnance for Native Americans is blatantly manifest in this passage. In the 
words of the language scholar, Steven Katz, the sense of progress can foster a dangerous 
"ethic of expediency" in which scientific, technological, and perceived societal advance-
ment become in themselves subsuming moral ends, justifiable at any cost, even if the 
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ends involve the displacement of a Native people or atrocities like the Holocaust (Katz 
257, 2 62, 265). 
The twentieth century has seen biological determinism align itself with the ethic of 
progress and expediency—commanding respect for its perceived objectivity; influencing 
public opinion, social policy, and legislation; and affecting, sometimes tragically, the 
lives of millions of people. Having confined the discussion thus far to hereditarian 
theory, in the next chapter we will explore through Gould's eyes some of the palpable, 




Ideas can have important social consequences with impacts upon the lives of 
millions. Old notions may emerge later, often in curiously altered contexts, but 
their source can still be recognized and traced to claims made in the name of 
science yet never really supported by more than the social prejudices (often 
unrecognized) of their proposers. Ideas matter in tangible ways. 
Stephen Jay Gould (Flamingo 321) 
As with the atom bomb, birth control technology, or genetic engineering, the most 
controversial manifestations of science are those with distinctly practical relevance. 
Biological determinism, especially in its interpretation of evolutionary science, is no 
exception. If hypotheses about skull volume, brain weight, and intelligence testing were 
an isolated field of inquiry 	set apart from the real world as ivory tower musings of 
academics 	biological determinism would likely have waned long ago. But its longevity 
and vitality bespeak a deeply rooted relevance to the day-to-day function of governments, 
economic and educational systems, and individual lives. According to Gould, biological 
determinism is almost always cited as justification for social action, social policy, or 
maintaining the social status quo. This chapter will examine palpable examples of 
hereditarianism in action. 
3.1 A Thumb on the Scale—The A Priori Judgment in Action 
Biological determinist ideology ripples throughout American history as a support for 
slavery, for the American invasion of the Philippines in 1899, for forced sterilization of 
the mentally retarded, for strict immigration restriction laws of the 1920s, and for the 
recent upswing in the anti-welfare and anti-affirmative action sentiment. Worldwide, its 
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stretch has reached from Nazi Germany to Singapore. Through popular books like The 
Bell Curve (1994), millions of contemporary readers have been exposed to biological 
determinist ideology. 
In The Mismeasure of Man, Gould emphasizes that hereditarianism has been 
promoted not through the crackpot musings of marginal scientists, but rather by the 
serious work of premier scientists at the forefront of their fields. One example was the 
renowned naturalist / paleontologist / geologist, Louis Agassiz (1807-1873) 	whose 
Harvard professorship Gould now occupies. For achievements that included ground-
breaking studies of fish fossils and the discovery of geological evidence for ice ages, 
Agassiz was perhaps the most widely respected naturalist of his time. What is it about 
Agassiz that Gould finds objectionable? Agassiz believed strongly that different human 
races represented different species. This and his widespread credibility helped provide a 
scientific rationalization for pro-slavery sentiments (Lurie 1: 73). 
By denying that his scientific theories possessed political ramifications, Agassiz 
avoided openly acknowledging that his polygenistic views defended slavery: 
. . Let the politicians, let those who feel themselves called upon to regulate 
human society, see what they can do with the results. . . . We disclaim, however, 
all connection with any question involving political matters. It is simply with 
reference to the possibility of appreciating the differences they have originated 
all over the world, and under what circumstances, that we have here tried to trace 
some facts respecting the human races. (qtd. in Gould, Mismeasure 45) 
The inquiry for objective truth is Agassiz's only avowed interest here, not political 
influence. But Gould presents Aggassiz's defense as an archetypically-veiled 
rationalization for discrimination against Negroes, citing the following personal 
correspondence to his mother after Agassiz had been served by Negro waiters at a 
Philadelphia hotel restaurant: 
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In seeing their black faces with their thick lips and grimacing teeth, the wool on 
their head, their bent knees, their elongated hands, their large curved nails, and 
especially the livid color of the palm of their hands, I could not take my eyes off 
their face in order to tell them to stay far away. And when they advanced that 
hideous hand towards my plate in order to serve me, I wished I were able to depart 
in order to eat a piece of bread elsewhere, rather than dine with such service. 
(qtd. in Gould, Mismeasure 45) 
Though such overt racial bias may not have been uncommon among statesmen and scien-
tists of the Civil War era, it is difficult to imagine this frame of mind not influencing the 
objectivity of the scientist. 
Gould describes a series of letters written by Agassiz to S. G. Howe, a member 
of Abraham Lincoln's administration, who had solicited Agassiz's opinion about the 
optimal post-war role of Negroes. In his advice to Howe, Agassiz acknowledged the 
importance of granting legal equality to Negroes, but balked at the suggestion that they 
be afforded true social equality: 
Social equality I deem at all time impracticable. It is a natural impossibility 
flowing from the very character of the Negro race. . . . No man has a right to what 
he is unfit to use. . . . Let us beware of granting too much to the negro race in the 
beginning, lest it become necessary to recall violently some of the privileges which 
they may use to our detriment and their own injury. (qtd. by Gould, Mismeasure 
48) 
These were not the isolated musings of an ivory tower academic. These were words that 
reflected and reinforced racially oppressive sentiment widespread in the American South 
after the Civil War. It is easy to suspect that thoughts such as these contributed to an 
intellectual bulwark, both spoken and unspoken, that kept Jim Crow alive for the next 
one hundred years in the American South. 
Recapitulationist theory (subsequently disproved entirely by the theory of neoteny 
/ paedomorphism) was easily applied in the political realm in support of colonialism. 
Because it ranked the adults of undeveloped nations with the children of civilized 
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nations, the logical inference was that the people of underdeveloped nations were unfit 
to govern themselves. Reverend Josiah Strong was a prominent New York cleric who, 
in this 1900 rebuttal, criticized Henry Clay for expressing doubts about the morality of 
this inference : 
Clay's conception was formed when the old carpenter theory of the universe 
obtained, before modern science had shown that races develop in the course 
of centuries as individuals do in years, and that an undeveloped race, which is 
incapable of self-government is no more of a reflection on the Almighty than is 
an undeveloped child who is incapable of self-government. The opinions of 
men who in this enlightened day believe that the Filipinos are capable of self-
government because everybody is, are not worth considering. (Strong 289-290) 
Not a tolerant view from this man of the cloth, but cited by Gould as clearly illustrative 
of the cultural-political embeddedness of both religion and science. Gould alludes to a 
similar view propounded by British philosopher, Benjamin Kidd, who in 1898 argued 
that tropical Africa was manifestly fit for colonization because its "child-like" natives 
were so obviously unfit to govern themselves (Ontogeny 131). Africa's wholesale sub-
division into colonies ensued. 
Although twentieth-century biological determinism has downplayed physical 
measurement comparisons in favor of the more abstract concept of intelligence differ-
ences, its goal of influencing social policy persisted. New Jersey's Henry Goddard 
championed the first spirited association of intelligence testing with social advocacy. 
He argued that intelligence constituted a raw material critically important to the 
construction of a sound society: 
The significance of [intelligence testing] for human progress and efficiency can 
hardly be appreciated at once. Whether we are thinking of children or adults it 
enables us to know a very fundamental fact about the human material. The impor-
tance of this in building up the cooperative society such as every community aims 
to be, is very great. The mechanical engineer could never build bridges or houses if 
he did not know accurately the strength of materials, how much of a load each will 
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support. Of how infinitely greater importance is it then we seek to build up a social 
structure that we should know the strength of our materials. (28-29) 
Goddard saw intelligence testing as a means to assure that every person assumed a 
position in society commensurate with his or her intellectual raw material. He also 
equated lower levels of measured intelligence with antisocial tendencies, stating that 
"every investigation of the mentality of criminals, misdemeanants, delinquents, and 
other antisocial groups has proven beyond the possibility of contradiction that nearly 
all persons in these classes and in some cases all are of low mentality" (72). 
Highly concerned about what he saw as an excessive number of morons in 
America, Goddard performed a study of newly arriving immigrants at New York's Ellis 
Island in 1912. Often illiterate and without adequate knowledge of English, immigrants 
were selected (by Goddard's own procedural description) for visible signs of possible 
mental defectiveness and asked to take an intelligence test. The process by which 
Goddard and his assistants selected participants is, in itself, a case study of "thumb-on-
the-scale," a priori bias. According to Gould's examination of Goddard's experiment 
notes, Goddard instructed his assistants to pick out the feeble-minded by sight and to 
exclude the "obviously normal" from the sample (Gould, Mismeasure 165). Though he 
would subsequently promote it as an objective study, the experimenter's subjective 
impressions about what people "look like" were well apparent. 
Goddard's report concluded that among arriving immigrants, 83 percent of the 
Jews, 80 percent of the Hungarians, 79 percent of the Italians, and 87 percent of the 
Russians were indeed morons. He advocated strict immigration policies to combat the 
influx of such feeble-mindedness into the United States and took satisfaction that the 
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number of immigrants deported for feeble-mindedness increased several fold in 1913 and 
1914 (Gould, Mismeasure 168). 
Goddard's concern, echoed by other twentieth-century determinists, was that 
American social fabric was under attack on two fronts: 1) the immigration of mentally 
inferior people, and 2) the unregulated reproduction of mentally inferior people already 
here. The enactment of several forced-sterilization laws nationwide attests to the popu-
larity of Goddard's "moronic threat" view on the domestic level. A 1913 Iowa law, for 
example, dedicated itself to "the prevention of the procreation of criminals, rapists, idiots, 
feeble-minded, imbeciles, lunatics, drunkards, drug fiends, epileptics, syphilitics, moral 
and sexual perverts, and diseased and degenerate persons" (Kamin, "Pioneers" 484). 
The 1917 Army Study on Intelligence by Harvard psychologist Robert Yerkes—
as well as its subsequent interpretation and nationwide popularization by psychologists 
Louis Terman of Stanford and Carl Brigham of Princeton—helped propel "IQ Testing" 
into national consciousness and fostered the legislative atmosphere that enacted the 
strictest immigration regulations in the nation's history. Gould characterizes Robert 
Yerkes as a psychologist dissatisfied with his field's lack of respect among "hard 
sciences," such as physics and chemistry. To counter this image, Gould suggests, Yerkes 
discerned the tremendous increase in prestige and credibility that would accompany the 
injection of quantitative method into psychology. 
The U.S. Army commissioned Yerkes to provide mental assessment protocols that 
would aid in the job classification of draftees. Yerkes developed a "point scale" version 
of Billet's test, deliverable in two formats: "Alpha" for administration to English 
speakers, and the more visually oriented "Beta" format for those who had not mastered 
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English. The Army Study tested over two million men, and would prove to be the most 
extensive IQ study done to that date. 
Its results provided extensive intelligence data for a wide variety of racial and 
ethnic groups, and fuel for the biological determinists. Yerkes's study reported an 
intelligence hierarchy based on nationality, with primarily Nordic and Teutonic countries 
(such as Canada, Britain, and Scandinavia) at the top, and Latin, Slavic, and Eastern 
European countries (such as Italy, Hungary and Poland) at the bottom. It was also the 
first study to show a higher average intelligence score for American Whites as compared 
to American Blacks. 
Yerkes wrote the foreword to Carl Brigham's 1923 work, A Study of American 
Intelligence. Commenting there on Brigham's application of the Army Study to immi-
gration advocacy, Yerkes wrote that "the author presents not theories and opinions but 
facts. It behooves us to consider their reliability and their meaning, for no one of us as a 
citizen can afford to ignore the menace of race deterioration or the evident relations of 
immigration to national progress and welfare" (Yerkes vii-viii). 
In his 1923 work, A Study of American Intelligence, Carl Brigham invoked 
Darwinian theory to draw hereditarian conclusions from the Army data: 
If intelligence counts for anything in the competition among human beings, it is 
natural to expect that individuals of superior intelligence will adjust themselves 
more easily to their physical and social environment, and that they will endow their 
children not only with material goods, but with the ability to adjust themselves to 
the same or a more complex environment. To select individuals who have fallen 
behind in the struggle to adjust themselves to the civilization their race has built as 
typical of that race is an error, for their position itself shows that they are, for the 
most part, individuals with an inferior hereditary endowment. (194) 
Brigham's staunch advocacy helped afford the scientific legitimacy required by Congress 
to pass the Johnson-Lodge Immigration Act of 1924. Though neither Brigham nor 
31 
Yerkes testified at congressional hearings, their influence was manifest in the frequent 
allusions made to their work by witnesses such as Harry Laughlin, Expert Eugenics 
Agent of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization (Kamin, "Pioneers" 
499-500). The Johnson-Lodge act successfully rolled back annual immigration from 
Southern and Eastern European countries to quotas representing two percent of each 
nationality's American representation in the 1890 American census. No such restriction 
was imposed on immigration from Northern or Western European countries. The quotas 
remained in effect throughout the 1930s, denying entrance to large numbers of German 
Jews who were attempting to leave Germany. About these people, Gould writes 
eloquently, "we know what happened to many who wished to leave but had nowhere to 
go. The paths to destruction are often indirect, but ideas can be agents as sure as guns 
and bombs" (Mismeasure 233). 
Although Gould acknowledges the Army Study's widespread impact, he criticizes 
Yerkes's protocol as providing recruits with inadequate instructions, dim light, a highly 
stressful ambiance, and culturally loaded questions (e.g., asking what is missing from a 
picture of a gramophone lacking a sound horn) (Mismeasure 200). He also faults Yerkes 
for failing to separate genetic and environmental components from his data. To Gould, 
Yerkes was a scientist who 	supported by the societal power structure 	abandoned 
objectivity to advance a priori conclusions reinforcing that structure. In this case, the 
thumb was under the scale of Blacks and other "inherently less intelligent races," whom 
Yerkes believed he had proved uneducable to the same level as Whites (Ever Since 243). 
Gould notes with interest Brigham's interpretations of two Army Study findings 
that contradicted determinist tenets. The first was the observation that median intelli- 
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Figure 3-1. Army Study: Average Immigrant Test Performance vs. Years of Residence. 
(Brigham 94) 
32 
gence scores of Blacks from four northern states (Illinois, New York, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania) were significantly higher than the median scores of Whites from four 
southern states (Mississippi, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Georgia) (Bond 597). In A Study 
of American Intelligence, Brigham did not address this "northern Black over southern 
White" detail; he wrote instead only that the Army study detected a superiority of 
northern Blacks over southern Blacks: 
The superior intelligence measurements of the northern negro [sic] are due to three 
factors: first, the greater amount of educational opportunity, which does affect, to 
some extent, scores on our present intelligence tests; second, the greater amount of 
admixture of white blood; and third, wages, better living condition, identical school 
privileges, and a less complete social ostracism, tending to draw the more intelli-
gent negro to the North. (192) 
Thus, while acknowledging a minimal role for limited environmental influence, Brigham 
managed to infuse his discussion of this discrepancy with an essentially hereditarian tone. 
One cannot help but admire Brigham's skill as a rhetorician. Heads, he wins; tails, an 
unfavored race loses. 
A second Army Study obstacle for Brigham's determinism was its demon-
stration that, after twenty years of U.S. residency, the intelligence test performance of 
immigrant recruits equaled that of "native born" Americans. Figure 3-1, reproduced 
from Brigham's A Study of American Intelligence, illustrates the phenomenon. Gould 
criticizes Brigham for failing to acknowledge the more plausible environmentalist 
hypothesis for the phenomenon depicted in this graph—that test-taking ability increased 
as immigrants became more acclimated to American customs and language. In The 
Mismeasure of Man, Gould argues that Brigham simply assumed a priori that his tests 
measured innate intelligence, and applied the "tails you lose" tactic to his rhetorical 
counterattack by claiming that the intellectual caliber of recent immigrants (who were 
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predominantly from Eastern and Southern Europe) must be inferior to that of past 
immigrants (who contained a much higher number Northern Europeans, or "Nordics," 
Brigham's favored racial group) (Mismeasure 228). Figure 3-2 was employed by 
Brigham to illustrate the Army Study's differing performance distributions for Nordics, 
Mediterraneans, and American Blacks—and to argue against racial interbreeding: 
Figure 3-2. Army Study: Intelligence Testing Distributions by Race. (Brigham 200-201) 
Brigham founded the College Entrance Examination Board, helped develop the 
first version of the SAT college-entrance exam, and was a board member of Educational 
Testing Service in Princeton, New Jersey. It is disconcerting to note that so prominent a 
figure as Brigham once wrote that "running parallel with [European immigration trends] 
we have the most sinister development in the history of this continent, the importation of 
the negro" (xxi) and that "the able Jew is popularly recognized not only because of his 
34 
ability, but also because he is able and a Jew " (190). It might be argued that the first 
remark was intended to express indignation at the institution of slavery. In view of 
Brigham's penchant for racial ranking and the order he propounded, this seems unlikely. 
With advocates like Goddard, Brigham, and Stanford psychologist Lewis Terman 
(the developer of the highly standardized and widely distributed Stanford-Binet intelli-
gence test), laws permitting forced sterilization of the developmentally disabled and of 
others deemed "mentally defective" became more and more common. By 1935, about 
20,000 forced sterilizations had been performed in the United States based on 
sterilization-warranting "hereditary" conditions that included alcoholism, drug addiction, 
blindness, and deafness in some states (Flamingo 309). 
Researcher Nancy Gallagher notes that although California led the nation in 
eugenic sterilization laws, even small states such as Vermont joined the trend. The 
Vermont Eugenics Survey of the 1920s and 1930s culminated in the 1931 Vermont law 
allowing for the sterilization of the feeble-minded and handicapped. In a recent interview 
she emphasized that such laws did not arise as isolated aberrations; they were often 
enmeshed with progressive or even liberal social welfare reform issues like Special 
Education and other reforms affecting children (Gallagher). Her research on the Vermont 
Eugenics Survey indicates that it targeted the poor, families in trouble, unwed teenage 
mothers, and Abenaki Indians. The Abenakis were a northeastern tribe whose reluctance 
to abandon itinerant traditions and accept American culture had made them unpopular. 
Gould would quickly point out the equation of unpopularity with mental inferiority here. 
Gould's gift for inspiring human empathy through his writing is typified in "Carrie 
Buck's Daughter," a case study of a one such victim of the eugenic movement. In 1924, 
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Carrie Buck, a resident of the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and the Feeble-Minded 
in Lynchburg, became the plaintiff in a case argued all the way to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Both she and her mother (also deemed feeble-minded) were residents, and Carrie 
had recently given birth to an illegitimate daughter. In his oft-quoted 1927 pronounce-
ment that "three generations of imbeciles are enough," Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes 
delivered the majority opinion that her sterilization warrant should not be rescinded. 
With touching irony, Gould relates the true story of Carrie Buck's incarceration. (It 
is probable that she was institutionalized to protect the foster family relative that had 
raped and impregnated her.) Dr. K. Ray Nelson, the director of the institution in 1980, 
reexamined records of past residents and tracked down Carrie, who was still alive and 
residing in a nearby town. His visits, along with those of reporters and scholars, found 
her to be woman of normal intelligence (Flamingo 313). Carrie's daughter, Vivian, died 
in 1932 at the age of eight. Gould obtained Vivian's last school report card and observed 
average performance grades. With Wendell Holmes's "three generations of imbeciles" 
statement exposed as erroneous, Gould comments: "I don't know that such correction of 
cruel but forgotten errors of history counts for much, but I find it both symbolic and 
satisfying to learn that forced eugenic sterilization, a procedure of such dubious morality, 
earned its official justification (and won its most quoted line of rhetoric) on a patent 
falsehood" (Flamingo 318). Ironically, contemporary pro-life groups, viewing abortion 
as a procedure of dubious morality, might feel similarly about the ultimately recanted 
rape claim initially charged in. Roe v. Wade. 
Forays by late twentieth-century hereditarians into social and legislative advocacy 
embrace intelligence testing as proof for innate race and class differences. For example, 
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in 1969 Arthur Jensen argued in a Harvard Review article entitled "How Much Can We 
Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?" that perceived failures in remedial education 
programs were not the result of children's environmental deprivations: 
Compensatory education has been tried and apparently it has failed. 
Compensatory education has been practiced on a massive scale for several 
years in many cities across the nation. It began with auspicious enthusiasm and 
high hopes of educators. It had unprecedented support from Federal funds. It had 
theoretical sanction from social scientists espousing the major underpinning of its 
rationale: the "deprivation hypothesis," according to which academic lag is mainly 
the result of social, economic, and educational deprivation and discrimination—an 
hypothesis that has met with wide, uncritical acceptance in the atmosphere of 
society's growing concern about the plight of minority groups and the 
economically disadvantaged. 
The chief goal of compensatory education—to remedy the educational lag 
of disadvantaged children and thereby narrow the achievement gap between 
"minority" and "majority" pupils—has been utterly unrealized in any of the 
large compensatory education programs that have been evaluated so far. (1) 
Jensen ascribes the perceived problem, instead, to IQ's unresponsiveness to outside 
(environmental) correction, citing monozygotic twin studies by Cyril Burt as support 
(47). While acknowledging that environmental factors do play a role (especially with 
regard to school grades, as opposed to IQ), he uses Cyril. Burt's twin studies to calculate 
that 80 percent of variability in people's IQs can be attributed to hereditary causes. 
According to Gould, the first of Jensen's unsupported assumptions—and the central 
assumption of all hereditarian arguments about intelligence—is that there exists a single, 
definite, reified entity called "intelligence" or "Spearman's g factor"* (after its principal 
theorist, Charles Spearman). Second, while acknowledging that intelligence is molded by 
environmental as well as genetic influences, it gave the genetic component the "control-
ling interest" by stating that intelligence was 80 percent heritable. Jensen's claims relied 
on identical twin studies reported by the preeminent British psychologist and statistician, 
Spearman's concept of g will be examined in Chapter 4. 
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Cyril Burt (1883-1971). Studies of twins separated into different environments at birth 
are considered the only valid experimental vehicle through which to study heredity-vs.-
environment phenomena. 
Despite the discrediting of Jensen's argument, Gould uses it as an example of 
the power of ostensibly objective scientific observation to influence political policy. 
Although in 1976 Burt's twin studies would be exposed as having been based largely on 
falsified data (Dorfrnan), Jensen's article was read by many, including Singapore Prime 
Minister Lee Kwon Yew in the early 1980s. Lee had seen the statistic that college-
educated women in Singapore gave birth on average to 1.65 children, while uneducated 
women averaged 3.5 children. He then concluded that Singapore's status as a thriving 
business center in the East would be undermined if the relatively high reproductive level 
of less intelligent women were not countered. 
Through a nationwide media campaign ostensibly motivated by concerns about 
unintelligent masses enlarging their numerical advantage, Lee exhorted Singapore's 
better-educated women to marry and have more children. In an essay in The Flamingo's 
Smile, Gould rolls his eyes at Lee's citing of Jensen, and Jensen's citing of Burt, in a 
veritable cascade of pseudo-scientific misinformation. Referring to Lee's wholesale 
acceptance and promotion of Jensen's 80 / 20 "Nature / Nurture" ratio, Gould relates that 
"it sent a frisson of déjà-vu up my spine" (Flamingo 324). To Gould, the Singapore 
episode indicates that the plea for governmental intervention to curb reproduction of the 
less intelligent is a worldwide phenomenon—and it is misinformed. 
Political efforts for social reform that are undergirded by the hereditarian view 
of intelligence have continued to be major issues throughout the final quarter of the 
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twentieth century. During the 1960s the American physicist William Shockley, Nobel 
prize-winning inventor of the transistor, proposed a monetary incentive system whereby 
individuals with IQs below 100 would be compensated for undergoing voluntary steri-
lization (Gould, Mismeasure 28). The lower the IQ, the higher the compensation. 
In 1971 the Harvard psychologist, Richard Herrnstein, published the article, 
"IQ," in Atlantic Monthly. It claimed that socioeconomic class distinctions were chiefly 
a function of inherited intelligence, and that 	paradoxically—as society strives to 
equalize opportunities for all through social programs, it strengthens the stratification 
of an intelligence-based "meritocracy." In the article's 1973 companion book, 10 in the 
Meritocracy, Herrnstein wrote: 
	
The ties among I.Q., occupation, and social standing make practical sense. . 	If 
virtually anyone is smart enough to be a ditch digger, and only half the people are 
smart enough to be engineers, then society is, in effect, husbanding its intellectual 
resources by holding engineers in greater esteem, and on the average, paying them 
more. . . . The critics of testing say that the correlations between I.Q. and social 
class show that the I.Q. test is contaminated by the arbitrary values of our culture, 
giving unfair advantage to those who hold them. But it is no mere coincidence that 
those values often put the bright people in the prestigious jobs. By directing its 
approval, admiration, and money towards certain occupations, society promotes 
their desirability, and hence, competition for them. (124) 
Herrnstein wrote to confront what he described as the prevailing liberal-egalitarian 
orthodoxy in psychology at the time, which he claimed had been suppressing discussion 
of the social ramifications of intelligence's proven high heritability since the early days 
of mental testing. He equated this egalitarianism with Marxism and with what he 
perceived as failed "Great Society" programs of the 1960s. 
Herrnstein contended that egalitarian efforts to equalize opportunity actually 
engender "a society sharply graduated, with ever greater innate separation between the 
top and the bottom and ever more uniformity as far as inherited abilities are concerned," 
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and he commented (perhaps disingenuously) that "naturally we fmd this vista appalling, 
for we have been raised to think of social equality as our goal" (221). Herrnstein's 
essential warning was that egalitarianism, with its alleged failure to recognize indivi-
duals' inherent mental differences, accentuates the dangerous class divisions that it aims 
to equalize. 
One of the most widely read recent works promoting hereditarian views on 
intelligence was The Bell Curve, published in 1994 by Herrnstein and Charles Murray. 
It advances Herrnstein's concept of a "cognitive elite," born as the unintended conse-
quence of today's more equitable social opportunities and ever more sharply alienating 
lower from upper classes: 
The upshot is that the scattered brightest of the early twentieth century have 
congregated, forming a new class. . . . Membership in this new class, the cognitive 
elite, is gained by high IQ; neither social background, nor lack of money will bar 
the way. But once in the club, usually by age eighteen, members begin to share 
much else as well. Among other things, they will come to run much of the 
country's business. In the private sector, the cognitive elite dominate the ranks of 
CEOs and the top echelon of corporate executives. Smart people have no doubt 
always had the advantage in commerce and industry, but their advantage has grown 
as the barriers against the "wrong" nationalities, ethnicities, religions, or 
socioeconomic origins have been dismantled. (510). 
Herrnstein and Murray first dispute the strict environmentalist claim that parental 
socioeconomic status and local educational opportunities are the major factors 
determining intelligence and life success—and offer an alternative hypothesis in which 
inheritance of parental intelligence plays the predominating role. The book's second 
contention, strongly implied but never directly stated, is that demonstrable race 
differences in IQ play predominating causal roles for crime, overpopulation, unem-
ployment, and other social ills. 
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The Bell Curve articulately promoted to a large popular audience the following 
determinist tenets and related social policies: 
• Intelligence is a single, concrete, and verifiable entity that is easily quantifi-
able by one variable defined originally by Charles Spearman as "g." 
• IQ tests measure "g" very well, and "when properly administered, the tests 
are not measurably biased against socioeconomic, ethnic, or racial groups. 
They predict a wide variety of socially important outcomes" (15). 
• There exist differences in intelligence between groups of people, and these 
differences are largely (though not entirely) inherited. Environmental 
influences exist, but are not predominant. 
• Ethnic IQ differences correlate with differences in social traits such as crime, 
illegitimacy, morality, and civic-mindedness. 
• People at the top and bottom of the socioeconomic ladder are in their 
respective places primarily because of biological predestination, not 
"nurture" or environment. 
• Egalitarianism is detrimental to society. Interventionist social policies such 
as inner city supplemental education programs and Affirmative Action pro-
grams have failed. They have failed because the limitations of innate low 
intelligence are insurmountable. Herrnstein and Murray believe that "the 
egalitarian ideal of contemporary political theory underestimates the impor-
tance of the differences that separate human beings. It fails to come to grips 
with human variation. It overestimates the ability of political interventions to 
shape human character and capacities" (532). 
• Past hereditary and wealth-based inequities of social structure have now 
been supplanted by a color-blind meritocracy that is based predominantly on 
intelligence differences. Everyone is now free to assume his or her rightful 
place on the hierarchy, based on intellectual merit. 
Herrnstein and Murray, whose arguments will be explored further as this thesis 
progresses, serve as the torch-bearers for a cadre of hereditarian theorists that also 
includes Arthur Jensen, Richard Lynn, and J. P. Rushton. In the following section we 
will examine the rhetorical techniques employed by some of these theorists—in the face 
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of what Gould insists is a lack of demonstrable data—to disseminate biological 
determinist views and gain support for related social policy. 
3.2 Science and Rhetoric—Or, How to Win Friends and Eliminate People 
It is one thing to theorize about eugenic sterilization or racial / class discrimination, but 
it is yet another to persuade others successfully to one's cause. Gould's major self-
appointed role is a counter-rhetorical one. With the aid of Kamin, Montague, and other 
skeptics of biological determinism, Gould aims to expose and refute what he perceives as 
the misuse of biological science to validate sociopolitical inequity. 
"Propaganda" connotes the use of verbal underhandedness in argument and 
persuasion. Its negative connotation generally assures that we apply the word only to 
arguments to which we are opposed, so it is not surprising that hereditarians and 
opponents such as Gould might dismiss many of each other's arguments as propaganda. 
A reader may very well consider this thesis propaganda for its acknowledged positive 
framing of Stephen Jay Gould's work. A truly impartial reader 	aware of the frequently 
rhetorical aspect of writing—must weigh the value of a written work with the author's 
apparent motive in mind. Credibility should rest on the author's apparent honesty and 
fairness of motive. The perspective of the evaluator— itselfprone to bias by personal 
circumstance and belief systems—is key. 
In day-to-day life, calculated misinformation is ubiquitous, but often hidden. 
Historian Oliver Thomson, in his work, Mass Persuasion in History (1977), contends that 
political persuasion can occur at an almost subliminal level wherein political assumptions 
and preferences are easily presented as incontrovertible facts. He considers this insinu-
ation of sociopolitical ideas into everyday experience with great concern: 
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The spreading of these ideas is slow and insidious. It is not necessarily deliberate 
or controlled by even an identifiable elite, but does quite genuinely trap whole 
peoples in a lifetime of acquisitiveness or racial hatred or useless conflict or 
obsessive puritanism. The ideas spread so widely that they become confused with 
absolute truths. . . . It becomes evident that the most dangerous propaganda is the 
kind which is not recognized as such at all, either by its audience or even by its 
perpetrators. It is the steady drip, drip, drip of aggressive, prejudiced or materialist 
ideas which those competing to be social leaders project through all the media in 
their fight for personal success. (132) 
It is just such an insinuative quality that Gould rallies to highlight in the work of 
biological determinist theoreticians, and just the element that he labors hard in the details 
to disentangle and lay bare for the non-scientific reader. 
In A Rhetoric of Motives (1950), the rhetorician Kenneth Burke emphasizes the 
human tendency to view others not as individuals, but as members of groups, classes, or 
audiences that need to be wooed, courted, deceived, forced, or otherwise compelled 
toward a particular way of thinking 	in other words, as objects to be manipulated. To 
rally people to our cause or belief system, Burke writes, we must convince them that we 
identify with their own values, and that—in a world of Us 's and Them 's—we are an 
empathetic member of their own superior group of Us 's, not of the evil, undesirable, or 
untidy Them 's (19-27). Burke views mystery as a sort of awe-demanding smoke screen 
whose purpose is to cloud people's discernment of the persuasive forces directed at them 
(114-127, 331-332). 
Although without direct reference to Burke or other rhetorical scholarship, Gould 
portrays biological determinists as employing the rhetorical devices of identification 
and mystery. Much as Gould himself is accused (by critics such as Frank Schmidt) of 
"preaching to the choir" by propounding comforting egalitarian notions that many un-
scientific lay people want to hear, so too do the ideas of hereditarian theorists provide a 
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comforting sense of identity to those occupying relatively privileged positions within 
societies—telling them what they want to hear. 
For example, in his book, Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence (1920), 
Henry Goddard flattered his readers (courting their identification) by stating that only 
readers of above-average intelligence would be interested in reading about intelligence 
ranking (32). Determinist arguments are quick to align with a dispassionate and objective 
science, in effect invoking science as a higher power, much as our less secular ancestors 
might have invoked a deity to which blind faith was due. 
It might be argued that science, despite its claims to dispassionate objectivity, is 
just as much a mystery to the average human as any notion of a divine power—and 
therefore just as potentially persuasive. To the common person, science may often be 
perceived with the same sense of awe, intangibility, unprovability, mystery—and 
credulous deference. 
Gould describes the pro-slavery sympathies harbored by the polygenist Louis 
Agassiz, who was considered by many to have been America's greatest nineteenth-
century biologist. Though Agassiz was known to be a highly religious man, he believed 
Negroes were a separate species from Caucasians. This inconsistency causes Gould to 
wonder whether Agassiz applied toward Negroes the biblical command to "love thy 
neighbor" (Ever Since 243). Might polygeny, with the exonerating biblical exclusion it 
offered, have been a message that a southern plantation owner would have welcomed? 
How many plantation owners, "wanting to believe," would have questioned its veracity? 
Or would they simply have accepted it as they would the Sermon on the Mount? Why 
question a scientist, who by definition is much better equipped to "know"? 
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Gould decries the sometimes sinister homeostatic role that such ostensibly credible 
contentions have played repeatedly throughout the history of science in bolstering ideo-
logical support for oppressive social systems. Gould responds sharply to Agassiz's anti-
egalitarian rhetoric (which resurfaces perennially in determinist writing): 
Similar arguments, carrying the apparent sanction of science, have been 
continually invoked in attempts to equate egalitarianism with sentimental hope 
and emotional blindness. People who are unaware of this historical pattern tend 
to accept each recurrence at face value: that is, they assume that each statement 
arises from the "data" actually presented, rather than from the social conditions 
that truly inspire it. (Gould, Ever Since 243) 
As a scientist, writer, and historian of science, Gould is keenly aware of the miscon-
ceptions to which the lay audience is vulnerable. In "hard" sciences such as chemistry 
and physics, a well-written lab report can be almost as informative as seeing a pheno-
menon with one's own eyes in the laboratory. This is not so in the less palpable realm of 
racial comparisons, however, where the "conclusion" may well have been written before 
the experiment was even conducted—as seems to have been the case with Cyril Burt's 
twin studies (Dorfman). Gould asserts that all nineteenth-century polygeny and physical 
measurement theories supporting racial differences—however prominent their propo-
nents—have since been discredited. 
The most notorious application of biological determinism to social policy, of 
course, occurred throughout the German Holocaust of the 1930s and 1940s. Gould, 
Kenneth Burke, and the North Carolina State University language scholar Steven Katz 
provide an interesting triangulation upon the rhetorical mechanisms that helped to 
organize Nazi bureaucracy into a monolithic killing machine. In "The Most Unkindest 
Cut of All" in Dinosaur in a Haystack (1995), Gould discusses the German Wannsee 
Protocol of 1942—the high-level government conference at which plans for the "Final 
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Solution" (eradicating Jews from German-held nations) were solidified. Gould explores 
what he sees as Adolf Hitler's utter misappropriation of Darwinian theory, "the distortion 
of a statement about differential reproductive success into a bogus validation of mass 
murder as natural" (316). 
The technical details of just how to classify people as "sufficiently Jewish" to 
warrant expulsion or death were hashed out at the Wannsee conference. Half-breeds 
(humans having one Aryan and one Jewish parent) and full-breed Jews were to receive an 
expulsion or death sentence, with exemptions being available only for half-breeds who 
had reproduced with full-blooded Aryan mates. Such exemptions required high level 
approval, as well as submission to sterilization. A quarter-breed was exempted, but 
authorities could rescind his or her exemption for reasons as ludicrous as having a general 
appearance that was "racially particularly objectionable so that he already outwardly 
must be included among the Jews" (314). Gould asks, "What can be more insane than 
madness that constructs its own byzantine taxonomy—or are we just witnessing the 
orderly mind of the petty bureaucrat applied to human lives rather than office files?" 
(314). 
In Mein Kampf(1925, 1927), Adolf Hitler harnessed what Gould describes as an 
incomplete understanding of Darwinian theory to urge an inevitable and biologically 
preordained triumph of the strong over the weak. The idea was that helping the weak 
went against the iron logic of nature and was detrimental to the strong. Invoking the 
"good of the species," Hitler wrote: 
In the struggle for daily bread all those who are weak and sickly or less determined 
succumb. . . . And struggle is always a means for improving a species' health and 
power of resistance and, therefore, a cause of its higher development. . . . For, since 
the inferior always predominates numerically over the best, if both had the same 
46 
possibility of preserving life and propagating, the inferior would multiply so 
much more rapidly that in the end the best would inevitably be driven into the 
background, unless a correction of this state of affairs were undertaken. Nature 
does just this by subjecting the weaker part to such severe living conditions that by 
them alone the number is limited, and by not permitting the remainder to increase 
promiscuously, but making a new and ruthless choice according to strength and 
health. (284-286) 
It is easy to imagine how this skillful (though longwinded) invocation of an ostensibly 
ineluctable mystery of nature might have helped Adolf Eichmann to rationalize 
dispassionately the "difficult living conditions, then kill the survivors" approach of his 
Jewish master plan. 
Gould labels such thinking a misinterpretation of evolutionary theory by quoting 
Darwin from Origin of Species: ". . . I use the term Struggle for Existence in a large and 
metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another, and including (which 
is more important) not only the life of the individual, but success in leaving progeny. . . . 
A plant on the edge of a desert is said to struggle for life against a drought" (qtd. in 
Dinosaur 316). Gould believes that the role of competition in species survival, though 
undeniable, was overemphasized in popular opinion during periods of aggressive 
expansion and conquest. To Gould, the role of cooperation has been under-emphasized 
or ignored. 
In "The Ethic of Expediency: Classical Rhetoric, Technology, and the Holocaust," 
Steven Katz analyzed a 1942 German technical document proposing structural 
modifications to gas vans used to "process" Jews by carbon monoxide asphyxiation. 
A Mr. Just, the writer of the memo, makes the following recommendations to his 
supervisor, Walter Rauff: 
• He advises that the volume of the vans must be decreased to improve vehicle 
stability and to improve efficiency by requiring less carbon monoxide to 
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displace the contained air: "If the load space is reduced, and the vehicle is 
packed solid, the operating time can be considerably shortened" (qtd. in Katz 
255). 
• He suggests that improved lighting is necessary because "the load" has a 
tendency to press hard against the doors in unlighted vans, following the 
external light. "Also, because of the alarming nature of darkness, screaming 
always occurs when the doors are closed. It would therefore be useful to light 
the lamp before and during the first moments of the operation" (qtd. in Katz 
256). 
• For easier cleaning, Just advises that a floor drain be installed in each van. 
The memo refers only to the "load," the "merchandise," and the number of "pieces to be 
processed." It never uses terms that might remind the reader of the humanity of those for 
upon whom the vans were to operate. To Katz, and I am sure to Gould as well, the 
anesthetizingly rhetorical power implicit in this document's coldly objective ethos is just 
as appalling as the process it was supporting. To me, Henry Goddard's ideally efficient 
society and Richard Herrnstein's driving meritocracy of the cognitive elite embody— 
certainly not in degree, but in kind 	this same, coldly objective frame of mind. 
The rhetorician Kenneth Burke shares Katz's indignation at the subtle ability of 
impersonal technical language to legitimize genocide in Nazi Germany: "The history of 
the Nazis has clearly shown that there are cultural situations in which scientists, whatever 
may be their claims to professional austerity, will contrive somehow to identify their 
specialty with modes of justification, or socialization, not discernible in the sheer motions 
of the material operations themselves" (Burke 32). This describes well the coldly 
efficient utilitarianism so obvious in Just's letter to Rauff. Just is a methodical, 
detail-oriented technical worker, trying conscientiously to improve the process at hand, to 
further the progress of his organization and himself, and to identify himself seamlessly 
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with dominant power. Burke comments as well on the sense of mystery shared by both 
science and deity: 
In its transcendence of natural living, its technical scruples, its special tests of 
purity, a clinic or laboratory can be a kind of secular temple, in which ritualistic 
devotions are taking place, however concealed by the terminology of the surface. 
Unless properly scrutinized for traces of witchcraft, these could furtively become 
devotions to a satanic order of motives. At least such was the case with the 
technological experts of Hitlerite Germany (32). 
Burke is describing a technology garbed in a persuasive air of mystery. By virtue of its 
general incomprehensibility to the average person, science may paradoxically intensify 
its persuasive power over those conditioned to awe its mystique. 
To Gould, scientists bear rightful responsibility only for confirming or refuting 
facts, and for informing ethical thought—not for executing moral / ethical decisions. 
Ethical decisions to him are outside the scientific realm, subject only to our own indivi-
dual sense of humanity and empathy. "Science can supply information as input to a 
moral decision," Gould states, "but the ethical realm of 'oughts' cannot be logically 
specified by the factual 'is' of the natural world—the only aspect of reality that science 
can adjudicate" (Dinosaur 318). Gould sees important limits to the authority of science, 
limits that in his view have often been transgressed to provide rhetorical ammunition for 
the perpetuation of social injustices like the Holocaust. 
The overt and scientifically rationalized racial hatred of the Nazi era has been 
universally denounced, with the affirmation, "never again," being widely heard. No 
atrocity on its scale has occurred since, although recent events in Rwanda, Serbia, and 
East Timor evoke great concern. It is clear from these events that the building blocks of 
racial hatred have not been forever dismantled. How can such building blocks remain 
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stockpiled at the close of the twentieth century? Perhaps one perpetuator is the ideology 
of biological determinism, subtly embedded within public policy debate. 
Herrnstein and Murray's 1994 book, The Bell Curve, offers a more contemporary 
example of the brand of biological determinist argument to which Gould is so mightily 
opposed. Two key points of the book are that group IQ differences correlate well with 
differences in social status, law abidingness, illegitimacy, morality, and civic-minded-
ness; and that Blacks—who have demonstrated a lower average IQ—are correspondingly 
less well endowed with these attributes. Another point is that past inequities in societal 
structures have today been superceded by a color-blind meritocracy based only on intelli-
gence differences, with all people now being free to assume their place in a hierarchy 
based increasingly on (primarily innate) intellectual merit. 
Herrnstein and Murray present their case in an easy-to-read, "We're just telling 
you the facts" style. "Much as some observers wished it were not true," they write, 
"there is often a need to assess differences between people as objectively, fairly, and 
efficiently as possible, and even the early mental tests often did a better job Of it than any 
of the alternatives" (6). The book relies heavily upon statistical analyses performed by 
the authors upon data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). This 
survey tracked a wide variety of educational, occupational, and social variables for over 
ten thousand American youth who were between the ages of fourteen and twenty-two 
when the ongoing survey began in 1979. The authors performed their analyses on data 
that had accumulated up to the early 1990s. 
Herrnstein and Murray portray American society at the close of the twentieth 
century as a society undergoing an unprecedented stratification into classes of differing 
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intellectual capacities. Although they attempt to associate many social ills such as out-of-
wedlock births, unemployment, and even health problems with group intelligence 
deficits, Herrnstein and Murray believe that cognitive stratification does offer benefits: 
Chief among them is the triumph of an American ideal. Americans believe that 
each person should be able to go as far as talent and hard work will take him, and 
much of what we have described is the realization of that conviction, for people 
with high IQs. The breadth of the change was made possible by twentieth-century 
technology, which expanded the need for people with high IQs by orders of 
magnitude. But the process itself has been a classic example of people free to 
respond to opportunity and of an economic system that created opportunities in 
abundance. (511) 
But above all, the picture Herrnstein and Murray paint is one of fear 	fear within the 
"cognitive elite" that the less intelligent are becoming more and more dangerous to live 
around, and fear among the less intelligent that a new type of conservatism is burgeoning 
in America, a conservatism that is "along Latin American lines, where to be conservative 
has often meant doing what is necessary to preserve the mansions on the hills from the 
menace of the slums below" (518). 
At eight hundred pages, with over 250 pages of appendices, notes, and biblio-
graphies, the book is ostensibly well-researched and documented. From a rhetorical 
standpoint, however—beneath the abundant citations, cross references, correlation 
charts, and linear regression analyses—there appears a permeating lilt of what Harvard 
psychologist, Howard Gardner, calls "scholarly brinkmanship": 
Whether concerning an issue of science, policy, or rhetoric, the authors come 
dangerously close to embracing the most extreme positions, yet in the end shy 
away from doing so. Discussing scientific work on intelligence, they never quite 
say that intelligence is all-important and tied to one's genes; yet they signal that 
this is their belief and that readers ought to embrace the same conclusions. 
Discussing policy, they never quite say that affirmative action should be totally 
abandoned or that childbearing or immigration by those with low IQ's should be 
curbed; yet they signal their sympathy for these options and intimate that readers 
ought to consider these possibilities. Finally, the rhetoric of the book encourages 
readers to identify with the IQ elite, and to distance themselves from the 
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dispossessed in what amounts to an invitation to class warfare. Scholarly 
brinkmanship encourages the reader to draw the strongest conclusions, while 
allowing the authors to disavow this intention. (Gardner 63-64) 
So, in addition to what Gould and others see as questionable statistical data, Gardner 
perceives a disingenuously manipulative rhetoric to The Bell Curve. It is exemplified by 
the authors' calculated flattery towards readers arriving at page 121: "In all likelihood, 
almost all of your friends and professional associates belong in that top Class I [Very 
Bright] slice. Your friends and associates whom you consider to be unusually slow are 
probably somewhere in Class II [Bright]" (121). In this rhetorical ploy (perhaps used in 
homage to Henry Goddard), Herrnstein and Murray are clearly attempting to cultivate 
identification from readers. 
For its poundage alone, this eight-hundred page tome can command particular 
veneration from already-sympathetic lay people unversed in statistical convention. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 4, Gould contends that The Bell Curve's logical flaws are 
well camouflaged amidst the ample pages, seemingly by intent. This rhetorical technique 
overloads the reader with so much technical information that critical facts, possibly 
misrepresented, tend to be either missed entirely by the reader, or glossed through 
inattentively. Again, for many lay people the mystery of science can mean that the mere 
existence of a chart, graph, statistic, or formula is enough to seal the credibility of the 
thesis propounded. Scrutiny of the data is tedious at best; so much easier is it to take the 
author's word for its interpretation (especially if the writer propounds favored idea). 
The same snow-them-with-poundage technique has also been used by Arthur 
Jensen in his eight-hundred-page work, Bias in Mental Testing (Urchin 124-144). Here, 
Jensen writes this about documented Black / White IQ differences: 
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Whatever the causes of the statistical differences between the test scores of various 
racial groups within the United States, the preponderance of evidence leads to 
the conclusion that the tests themselves do not contribute to the differences. The 
observed racial group differences are real in the sense that they are not merely an 
artifact of the measuring instruments. (737) 
In his essay, "Jensen's Last Stand," Gould criticizes Jensen's book as being deliberately 
designed to capitalize on readers' lack of statistical expertise. "Numbers have undoubted 
powers to beguile and benumb," Gould writes, "but critics must probe behind numbers to 
the character of arguments and the biases that motivate them" (Urchin 144). As do most 
recent hereditarian works, Bias in Mental Testing presumes that intelligence has been 
indisputably proven to be embodied almost entirely within a single, reified mental entity 
(Spearman's "g" factor) that is measurable by linearly rankable IQ tests. Gould strongly 
disputes this point, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. Jensen also documents a 15-point 
average IQ difference between Black and White Americans (a difference Gould acknow-
ledges), and devotes four hundred pages to proving that IQ tests are not "statistically 
biased." 
Gould describes those four hundred pages as a rhetorical red herring, preying on 
reader unfamiliarity with the difference between "statistical bias" and what Gould terms 
"vernacular bias." In IQ testing, statistical bias is a methodological error that would be 
said to exist if a given IQ score possessed two different predictive values for two different 
groups of people. For example, a given test result would be statistically biased if it 
predicted one level of school grades for Blacks and another for Whites. But Gould 
and his allies do not contend that IQ testing is statistically biased; they concur that the 
same score generally has similar predictive value among different groups of people. 
"Vernacular bias" is the bias connotation most familiar to the average layperson. It 
signifies unfair advantage to or special treatment of one party—and is usually what 
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comes to mind when most lay people hear the term "bias." Gould's belief that cultural 
and environmental influences play a strong role in IQ test performance does align itself 
with the assertion that IQ testing is subject to vernacular bias. 
Because both sides of the debate agree with the assertion that "IQ testing is not 
statistically biased," Gould is appalled that Jensen devotes four hundred pages of charts, 
graphs, and statistics to its support: 
In short, the primary content of this book is simply irrelevant to the question that 
has sparked the IQ debate and that Jensen himself treated in his 1969 article: what 
does the lower average score of blacks mean? His concept of bias [statistical bias] 
does not address this issue. Yet, since this issue is intimately associated with our 
vernacular meaning of bias, nonstatistical reviewers (in Time and Newsweek, for 
example) have been consistently confused into believing that Jensen's voluminous 
data force us to reject environmental causes as the basis for group differences in IQ 
scores (Urchin 131). 
According to Gould, Jensen knew full well that many lay readers, scanning rather than 
scrutinizing, would misread his work as a proof against vernacular bias in IQ testing. 
Jensen's book seems to exemplify the rhetorical technique of "false implicature" 
described by University of Minnesota rhetorician Arthur Walzer. 
According to Walzer (who draws from the work of H. P. Grice), a written com-
munication is deceptive and unethical if it violates any of four important trusts that a 
reader is compelled to place in a writer. These trusts are that the information provided 
possesses adequate Quantity, Quality, Relevance, and Clarity (Walzer 152-153). Gould 
and Walzer would no doubt agree that Bias in Mental Testing falls shortest and is most 
deceptive in regard to the Relevance requirement. Readers assume Jensen is writing 
about the relevant topic of interest, vernacular bias, but he is not; he is writing about a red 
herring. 
In this chapter we have explored, from Stephen Jay Gould's perspective, some 
of the tangible human impacts of biological determinism in practice. We have also 
examined some of the persuasive techniques employed by biological determinists to 
enlist popular support. Chapter 4 will explore Gould's recurrent warning that "bad 
science" provides the cornerstone of the hereditarian argument. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPOSING BAD SCIENCE 
Because, as the adage states, "the devil is in the details," we now turn our focus to some 
of the technical foundations of determinist hypotheses. It might be said that Stephen 
Jay Gould is to popular evolutionary science what Ralph Nader is to the consumer 
economy—an independent evaluator who is willing to work tenaciously and against the 
grain of peers for the protection of consumers. Both provoke the anger of prominent 
members of society, and both claim that their goal is to leave the world a better place. 
But while Nader's sirens wail against material dangers, such as the "unsafe at any speed" 
Chevy Corvair, Gould aims to protect the public from something more intangible and 
elusive: the misapplication of evolutionary science toward inequitable sociopolitical ends. 
4.1 Scrutinizing the Cognitive Filter 
Gould has described himself as a writer for the perceptive lay person and can project an 
ethos of an interpreter charged with explaining the forest to one familiar only with the 
trees. He seems to distrust blind allegiance in any human era or context—be it the tacit 
loyalty to papal or royal authority that once shaped the Western lay person's view of 
life on earth, or today's more enlightened yet nonetheless tacit trust in the importance 
of dozens of scientific specialties (e.g., medicine, economics, engineering, and tech-
nologies). In observing the cultural context of apparently objective scientific ideas, 
Gould seems to be attempting to raise us from the forest floor, broadening what may 
have been a parochial view of human life on earth. 
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Gould shows special interest in the mechanism by which the non-scientific 
community's interpretation of human evolution is forged. Since neither policy-makers 
nor lay people can be expected to command a scientist's breadth of knowledge, a 
mediating "cognitive filter" has always been necessary to provide explanations and 
interpretations of scientific theory. Gould's closest scrutiny is reserved for this 
translation / application phase of the scientific communication process, and it is here 
—in the interstices of popularization itself 	that he searches for "forest and the trees" 
type bias. By this I refer to the rhetorical frame of reference that can clothe ostensibly 
objective popular translations of evolutionary theory. Later in this chapter, for example, 
we will examine Gould's assertion that Darwin's original theories were rhetorically meta-
morphosed for popular and political consumption. 
Gould is sensitive not only to those cognitive filters that he believes misrepresent 
valid science, but also to those which mask breaches in scientific integrity and incursions 
of science into realms he considers beyond its purview—ethics and morality. What then 
is Gould's definition of "good" science? It is a science free from inappropriate meta-
phors and untestable conjecture, a science in which fruitful dissent is encouraged, and 
life's ultimate questions (such as the nature of life, the origin of the universe, the 
beginning of time, etc.) are recognized as beyond testability. As an ardent opponent of 
creationism, Gould asserts this last prerequisite loudly: ". . . 'creation science'—as an 
untestable set of dogmatic proposals—could not qualify as science by any standard 
definition (Bully 456)." To Gould, we must not vilify scientists for failing to supply 
answers to ultimate type questions because only demagogues would pretend to. 
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As an example of the fruitful dissent that Gould views as characteristic of the 
beauty of science, he cites three alternate theories propounded for the extinction of 
dinosaurs. The first was that planetary warming caused dinosaur testes to malfunction. 
The second theory posited that angiosperms (flowering plants), which began to evolve 
toward the end of the dinosaur era, might have produced addictive psychoactive toxins 
that dinosaurs were unable to detoxify metabolically—thus poisoning the dinosaurs into 
extinction. The third theory, now widely accepted, was Luis and Walter Alvarez's 
contention that a comet or asteroid collided with the earth and caused a global darkness 
with fatal consequences for dinosaurs. 
According to Gould, the Alvarez theory has survived because it was testable and 
spawned hundreds of studies intended to confirm or refute its feasibility (Flamingo 425). 
In the most widely known studies, iridium 	an element rare on earth but abundant in 
comets and meteors 	was found to be abundant throughout the earth specifically at the 
geological stratum associated with the demise of dinosaurs. Inherently untestable, neither 
the Planetary Warming nor the Toxic Angiosperm theory generated tangible confirmatory 
research, and to Gould both must be discarded as unprovable conjecture. As for the 
Alvarez theory, evidence currently supports it, but as with all "good science," it will 
always be open to revision should future data prove contradictory. 
Though acknowledging the importance of metaphor in the creative mechanism of 
scientific discovery (e.g., the discovery of DNA first required the conceptualized meta-
phor of "sequentially coded assembly instructions"), Gould believes that metaphors have 
often been misapplied in the dissemination of scientific knowledge. He is an ardent critic 
of some translational metaphors historically used to convey evolutionary theory to non- 
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scientific audiences, particularly those theories that might be described as lingering 
vestiges of the Platonic tradition. A key Platonic tenet was belief in the existence of a 
single, overarching "Natural Law" to which all life has been and will continue to be 
subservient. As derivatives of this tradition, Gould cites the following "bad habits of 
Western Thought": 
Atomism—The assumption that after dissection of a physical or conceptual 
"whole" into parts, inferences made from the parts about the whole are always 
valid. 
Reductionism—The simplification of complex phenomena into more easily 
interpretable principles. 
Determinism 	The idea that all events have a definite, predictable, and 
determinable causes. 
To Gould, metaphors can deceive as well as teach. For instance, the reductionist "ladder 
of gradual progress" from amoeba to fish to amphibian to mammal to Homo sapiens 
discussed in Chapter 2 is to Gould a gross misrepresentation of evolution. 
Gould's reading of Darwin, the fossil record, and his own research culminating 
in the theory of punctuated equilibrium have convinced him that species evolve not 
gradually but in sudden geological bursts through a complex "bush" of ancestral lineages 
(most branches of which have died out long before our time). He sees the utilitarian 
"urge to progress" as the necessitating rationale for society's persistent clinging to 
comforting notions of gradual, unilinear evolution culminating in our own species. And, 
as we have explored, the perception of a directed, unilinear evolution to "higher races" 
has been a powerful and effective (mis)guiding rationale for slavery, imperialism, and 
Hitlerian atrocity. 
A related element of this "progress-colored" cognitive filter, according to Gould, 
has been an over-reliance upon "essentialism" or "reification"—the abstraction of 
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ostensibly sharply defined mental constructs from more subtle and ambiguous shadings 
of natural reality. "Ever since Plato . . . essentialism has dominated Western thought 
[and] encouraged us to neglect continua and to divide reality into a set of correct and 
unchanging categories" (Flamingo 161). Indeed, Gould believes that essentialism often 
ignores individual uniqueness and results in unwarranted pigeon-holing of humans, 
insects, or whatever species is being studied. Reification invites quantification, 
measurement, comparison, and ranking of relative worth based on group membership. 
To Gould, reification has had its most insidious impact in the realm of intelligence 
testing, where measurement and ranking of a hypothesized, reified "g" factor has become 
the linchpin of twentieth-century biological determinist argument. 
To Gould it is variation among individuals, not abstracted essences of "central 
tendency," that is the key to understanding physical reality and Darwinian evolution. 
He is skeptical of the power of statistics to adequately represent the nature of this 
individual variation, offering as an example the socioeconomic application of statistical 
means and modes to population income distribution. A reported gain in "mean income" 
might not represent an income gain for a large proportion of the population; it could be 
due largely to the highly weighted income gains of the minority in the very highest 
income levels. On the other hand, the rarely reported statistical "mode," which represents 
the most common income within a population, could be considered a truer representation 
of the overall population's income level. "Measures of central tendency differ in highly 
skewed distributions [such as those representing income distribution in Capitalist 
countries]—and a major source of employment for economic and political "spin doctors" 
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lies in knowing which measure to choose as the best propaganda for the honchos who 
hired your gun" (Full House 54). 
Preferring the term "cultural change" to "cultural evolution," Gould argues that 
cultural advance throughout history has been a function of additive learning rather than 
biological Darwinian processes. "The common designation of 'evolution' then leads to 
one of the most frequent and portentous errors in our analysis of human life and history—
the overly reductionist assumption that the Darwinist natural paradigm will fully 
encompass our social and technological history as well" (Full House 219). 
Jean Baptiste Lamarck was an early nineteenth-century evolutionary theorist who 
believed that acquired traits were transmissible by inheritance to progeny. Although the 
Lamarckian theory of biological evolution was superceded by Darwin's idea that natural 
selection acts upon undirected individual variation, Gould is quick to promote "cultural 
Lamarckianism" as the driving force of cultural change. "Lamarckian evolution is rapid 
and accumulative. It explains the cardinal difference between our past, purely biological 
mode of change and our current, maddening acceleration toward something new and 
liberating 	or toward an abyss" (Panda 84). I am reminded of Steven Katz's description 
of the "ethic of expediency" in Nazi Germany. To him the Nazi juggernaut was ideo-
logically fueled by the hypnotic mass delusion that Aryan biological superiority and 
cultural preeminence were not only manifest, but intimately entwined. 
Although it is comforting to believe that the advance of civilization from the Stone 
Age to the Space Age was enabled by concurrent physical evolutionary changes in our 
species, Gould states that he has seen no evidence that either the human body or mind has 
changed functionally within the last 100,000 years (Full House 219). It is somehow 
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humbling for us to conceive that, with proper training, a Cro-Magnon human would have 
been capable of intellectual endeavors that we twentieth-century humans often assume to 
exist solely within our own domain (e.g., art, mathematics, and science). 
4.2 How to Misunderstand Darwin 
Claptrap and bogus Darwinian formulations have been used to justify every form 
of social exploitation—rich over poor, technologically complex over traditional, 
imperialist over aborigine, conqueror over defeated in war. Every evolutionist 
knows this history only too well, and we bear some measure of collective 
responsibility for the uncritical fascination that many of us have shown for such 
unjustified extension. But most false expropriations of our chief phrase [natural 
selection] have been undertaken without our knowledge and against our will. 
Stephen Jay Gould (Dinosaur 315) 
Darwin's The Origin of Species (1859) reverberated widely in the field of social reform. 
Reformers contended that Christian morality and fairness, which had figured strongly 
in the formation of Western civilization's social and legal systems, must now be 
superceded by the impartial and sometimes unpalatable objectivity of evolutionary 
biology. "Proposals for change might shock traditional ethics," Gould explains, "but if 
they brought social procedure into harmony with human biology, we might establish a 
beginning of a rational and scientific order freed from ancient superstition and therefore, 
in the long run, humane in the literal sense" (Ontogeny 120). It is Gould's contention, 
however, that extrapolations of Darwinian theory onto the societal plain represent 
unwarranted extrapolations from Darwin's original work and intentions. 
Britain's Herbert Spencer wrote widely on evolution, science, and philosophy, and 
spearheaded the first application of evolutionary theory to the social milieu. He, not 
Darwin, coined the phrase "survival of the fittest" ("Spencer" and "Survival," Minerva). 
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Although Spencer used Darwin's work in forming his own theories (some of which have 
come to be known, mostly pejoratively, as "social Darwinism") he is credited with 
conceptualizing the evolutionary importance of the "struggle for survival" independently 
of Darwin. 
In Spencer's view, immutable natural law dictates that the survival and economic 
success of individuals in society are limited to only the fittest members of that society, 
with the less fit relegated deservedly to inferior social status and living conditions. And 
because Natural Law was the moving agent, it would be fruitless, wasteful, and counter-
productive to endeavor to improve the social fortunes of these lower classes. Social 
Darwinist ideology reputedly resonated well within laissez faire economic attitudes 
among the Victorian upper classes. 
Gould has taken it upon himself to scrutinize the cultural context of Darwinian 
theory's exegesis. He states that evolutionary theory did not just arise out of thin air in 
some sort of "Eureka!" epiphany for Darwin, nor did it arise solely from pure obser-
vations of Baconian inductivism. It was a combination of both, plus the impact of 
Darwin's upper class background (which secured him his post on the H.M.S. Beagle 
and boosted his professional credibility) and his familiarity with the work of political 
economists Thomas Malthus and Adam Smith. 
Malthus observed the logarithmic mode of population growth and the tendency 
of organisms to produce more offspring than can survive on existing food supplies. To 
Malthus this resulted in famines and epidemics as natural outcomes and could be checked 
only through the control of population. Darwin (and his co-discoverer of evolution, 
63 
Alfred Russel Wallace) read Malthus and extended his theory to include a natural 
selection of the better adapted among organisms competing for survival. 
Also indispensable to Darwin was Adam Smith's laissez faire theory of economics. 
In it, Smith propounded that individuals, working diligently to advance their own 
economic self interest, ultimately ensure the stability and good of the greater society. 
Gould describes Smith's concept: 
The essence of Smith's argument is a paradox of sorts: If you want an ordered 
economy providing maximal benefits to all, then let individuals compete and 
struggle for their own advantage. The result, after appropriate sorting and 
elimination of the inefficient, will be a stable and harmonious polity. Apparent 
order arises naturally from the struggle among individuals, not from the predestined 
principles of higher control. (Panda 66) 
Gould accepts Darwin's extraction of biological theory from economic theory. In fact, 
he seems to consider the biological version more valid than its economic progenitor: "It 
seems ironic that Adam Smith's system of laissez faire does not work in his own domain 
of economics, for it leads to oligopoly and revolution rather than to order and harmony" 
(Panda 68). 
Gould targets as particularly fallacious the determinist framing of evolution 
promoted by Herbert Spencer. Spencer saw evolution as a unidirectional progression 
through history, culminating in the uber-species of Homo sapiens sapiens and, by 
implication, uber 	and unter 	subgroups within our species. In his book, Social Statics, 
or the Conditions Essential to Human Happiness (1851), Spencer wrote: 
Humanity must in the end become completely adapted to its conditions. . . . 
Progress, therefore, is not an accident, but a necessity. Instead of civilization 
being artificial, it is a part of nature; all of a piece with the development of the 
embryo or the unfolding of a flower. The modifications mankind have undergone, 
and are still undergoing, result from a law underlying the whole organic creation; 
and provided the human race continues, and the constitution of things remains the 
same, those modifications must end in completeness. (65) 
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To Gould this notion nurtures wall!!, frizzy "for the good of the species" rationalizations 
that misread Darwin's more individualistic theories. "Darwin's mechanism works 
through the differential reproductive success of individuals who, by fortuitous possession 
of features rendering them more successful in changing local environments, leave more 
offspring" (Dinosaur 329). 
Gould interprets Darwin's perception of "the greater good of the species" as being 
an analog to Adam Smith's perception that individual gain only indirectly benefits the 
entire group, as a secondary after-effect. Smith's statement that "all direct causality lies 
in the struggle among individuals" applied from Darwin's perspective as well, according 
to Gould (qtd. in Dinosaur 329). It is more difficult to be proud of one's group's 
"superior" qualities when the individual's possession of those qualities is acknowledged 
as accidental rather than pre-ordained by group membership. 
As for unilinearity, Gould's essays frequently remind us that the fossil record 
(especially fossils found in zones such as Canada's Burgess Shale region) consistently 
supports the hypothesis that evolution has not been a "ladder" or "straight line." It has 
been, rather, a series of bush-like branchings and sub-branchings, many occurring 
concurrently in geological time, with contemporary species such as Homo sapiens 
representing merely the surviving twigs on more fully foliated ancestral branches that 
have now gone almost completely extinct. Gould's evolution is not a linear and 
progressive "path," but a fractal and contingent "bush." 
Attendant with the idea of evolutionary progress is the corollary concept of 
unilinear ranking and worth. In his personal writings, Darwin frequently reminded 
himself to eschew the notion of "higher and lower" animals (Ever Since 36). He viewed 
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the amoeba's ability to adapt to its environment, for example, as no less notable than the 
human being's ability to adapt to its own. Darwin wrote in The Descent of Man (1871) 
that his theories of evolution 
have given to man a pedigree of prodigious length, but not, it may be said, of noble 
quality. The world, it has often been remarked, appears as if it had long been 
preparing for the advent of man: and this, in one senses strictly true, for he owes his 
birth to a long line of progenitors. If any single link in this chain had never existed, 
man would not have been exactly what he now is. Unless we wilfully close our 
eyes, we may, with our present knowledge, approximately recognise our parentage; 
nor need we feel ashamed of it. The most humble organism is something much 
higher than the inorganic dust under our feet; and no one with an unbiassed mind 
can study any living creature, however humble, without being struck with 
enthusiasm at its marvellous structure and properties. (165) 
Gould states that Darwin even preferred the phrase "descent with modification" over 
"evolution" because the latter term possessed connotations of progress (and its attendant 
comparative ranking between and within species). Gould cites our predilection for 
ranking human groups according to presumed evolutionary attainment, which, he says, 
"remains a primary component of our global arrogance, our belief in dominion over 
rather than fellowship with, more than a million other species that inhabit our planet" 
(Ever Since 37). 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the discipline of "sociobiology" has 
become an important torch-bearer for biological determinism. Its chief proponent has 
been Edward 0. Wilson, Gould's colleague at the Harvard Museum of Comparative 
Zoology. His 1975 work, Sociobiology, impressed Gould for its extensive treatment of 
animal social behavior, but not for its closing chapter on the development of human 
social traits. The core tenet of sociobiology is the contention that virtually all human 
social behavior—be it aggression, spite, deception, xenophobia, conformity, gender- 
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specific social behavior, homosexuality, and even altruism—is determined by genetic 
influences: 
The hypothalamic-limbic complex of a highly social species, such as man, 
"knows," or more precisely it has been programmed to perform as if it knows, 
that its underlying genes will be proliferated maximally only if it orchestrates 
behavioral responses that bring into play an efficient mixture of personal survival, 
reproduction, and altruism. Consequently, the centers of the complex tax the 
conscious mind with ambivalences whenever the organisms encounter stressful 
situations. Love joins hate; aggression, fear; expansiveness, withdrawal; and so on; 
in blends designed not to promote the happiness and survival of the individual, but 
to favor the maximum transmission of the controlling genes. (4) 
Development and persistence of behaviors through history, according to the theory, 
depend largely upon their adaptive or maladaptive character. Since adaptive behaviors 
allow an individual's genes to survive, sociobiology argues, the capacity to execute 
adaptive social behaviors may be largely inherited. 
Gould sees in sociobiology another tool to help rationalize oppressive social 
systems. In an article in The New York Times Magazine on October 12, 1975, Wilson 
attributed gender-based social differences to genetic determinants: 
In hunter-gatherer societies, men hunt and women stay at home. This strong bias 
persists in most agricultural and industrial societies and, on that ground alone, 
appears to have a genetic origin... . My own guess is that the genetic bias is 
intense enough to cause a substantial division of labor even in the most free and 
most egalitarian societies. . . . Even with identical education and equal access to all 
professions, men are likely to continue to play a disproportionate role in political 
life, business and science. (qtd. in Gould, Urchin 29) 
In Gould's view, such sociobiological claims fall apart when one perceives, embedded 
within them, the a priori assumptions that 1) the trait in question was genetically deter-
mined, and 2) the trait was "naturally selected" for its adaptive value. Again, Gould 
sounds the penalty buzzer against "thumb-on-the-scale" science casting the social status 
quo as proper, adaptive, inevitable, and unchangeable—and therefore a definite waste of 
energy to attempt to change. To Gould, Wilson uses a "cart before the horse" logic 
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(analogous to that found in Paul Broca's brain weight studies) in assuming his own 
hypothesis was correct before adequate proof had been demonstrated. 
To Gould, Sociobiology's persistent application of Darwinian adaptationism to 
the historical development of human behavior is not good science, but rather an elaborate 
and unsupported metaphorical extrapolation 	a "cardboard Darwinism." Gould's key 
criticism of sociobiology is that it ignores non-genetic means of cultural transmission. 
Believing that cultural change is often mistaken for biological evolution, Gould 
frequently reiterates in his essays that little evidence exists for the human brain having 
evolved any functional improvement over the last 100,000 years (re-enter our Cro-
Magnon, perhaps doing calculus or successfully programming a video cassette recorder). 
In criticizing the ideas of sociobiology, Gould forwards his own favored belief in 
biological potentialism: He contends that although genetic influences are indeed very 
important factors in human behavior and social systems, it is a combination of culture, 
the environment, and the Lamarckian accumulation of learning—all acting upon a 
biologically determined substrate of human potential 	that ultimately shapes individual 
and societal behaviors. Gould decries our search for distinct "Nature vs. Nurture" 
categorizations, which to him are illusory oversimplifications of a complex interrela-
tionship. As phraseology more representative of this complexity, he prefers the terms 
"Determinism" and "Potentialism": "The statement that humans are animals does not 
imply that our specific patterns of behaviors and social arrangements are in any way 
directly determined by our genes. Potentiality and determination are different concepts" 
(Ever Since 251). 
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Human consciousness, a function of the brain's functional complexity, is at the 
heart of the issue. Whereas sociobiology might assert that social norms and institutions 
are a direct result of naturally selected, genetically inherited neuro-hoimonal functions, 
Gould views the cultural consequences of our large brains as secondary and incidental 
side-benefits of biological capabilities much more directly and practically linked to 
human survival (such as the cognitive and physiological endowments needed for 
improved hunting and evasion skills, or for the ability to act cooperatively). To Gould 
the neurological, anatomical, and physiological complexity necessary to effect these 
critical skills could also have permitted "side-effect" or "co-opted epiphenomenal" 
behavior to arise—behavior that can be irrelevant or even detrimental to species 
adaptation and survival. 
For example, one could argue that the more undesirable manifestations of human 
aggression are merely side-effects of the vitally important "fight or flight" neuro-
hormonal response that evolved earlier in our evolutionary past and protected our species 
from legitimate and formidable predators. Although contemporary human life is in no 
way free from predatory dangers demanding aggressive responses, the newspaper can 
usually be counted on to provide daily examples of destructive aggression (often in the 
form of murder, spousal abuse, road rage, or other antisocial behavior). While in the heat 
of the moment such behavior may seem "only natural" to its perpetrators, few would 
argue that such behavior is at all adaptive toward the perpetuation of our species. 
The Achilles' heel of sociobiology, according to Gould, is the fact that a true proof 
of its tenets is logistically impossible: The "experiment" necessary to prove genetic 
causation of social traits would involve multigenerational studies controlling for both 
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breeding and environment. And since we are a slow-breeding species not generally 
amenable to the vocation of lab rat, the supporting evidence for sociobiological theory 
is sparse, in Gould's view. Even if it were true that social skills and institutions are 
genetically determined, Gould uses the analogy of corrective eyeglasses to counter the 
contention that the consequences of one's "social genes" are unimprovable. If eyeglasses 
can correct an inherited vision defect (as they do for millions), why should it be fruitless 
to consider mass efforts to improve even "genetically inferior" social capacities. 
One sociobiological concept that Gould finds both intriguing and plausible is the 
idea of adaptive altruism. Darwin considered both "Gladiator" and "Altruist" perspec-
tives in his view of animal evolution. However, the Gladiator theory, promulgated by 
Darwin's ardent disciple, Thomas Henry Huxley, was much more widely disseminated 
and accepted. It interpreted "survival of the fittest" from a decidedly amoral perspective 
that emphasized constant struggle and belligerent combat among individuals and groups, 
and having the goal of gaining reproductive advantage through transmission of genes to 
the next generation. 
The Altruism theory posited that reproductive advantage might, at least on some 
occasions, issue from mutual aid and cooperative behavior among individuals. For 
example, if an individual animal gives its life in a mismatched confrontation that 
nonetheless succeeds in allowing that individual's kin to flee and survive, then a quantifi-
able percentage of the victim's genes will live on in the surviving kin. Gould suggests 
that, of the two theories, the Gladiator theory has garnered more support chiefly because 
it extrapolates more synergistically onto Adam Smith's laissez faire capitalist economic 
system. According to Gould, Darwin intended the term "struggle" in a metaphorical 
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sense, sometimes meaning physical combat and sometimes meaning cooperation. 
Darwin's first "struggle for existence" reference was to the plight of a 
plant in harsh, arid growing conditions. 
In summary, Gould opposes sociobiology for what he sees as its tacit and 
unprovable assumption that prevalent social behavior has become prevalent by virtue of 
genetic transmission and environment-driven natural selection. In its claims that the 
origins of human thought and behavior are largely inherited, sociobiology denies due 
consideration of the influence of learning and culture on behavior. Yet Gould does not 
deny that biology bears an important influence upon behavior and culture: 
I am supposed to be a "nurturist" in the great "nature-nurture" debate, but I find 
nothing upsetting in this notion of biological influence upon human behavior. 
Every scientist, indeed every intelligent person knows that human social behavior 
is a complex and indivisible mix of biological and social influences. The issue is 
not whether nature or nurture determines human behavior, for these factors are 
truly inextricable, but the degree, intensity, and nature of the constraint exerted by 
biology upon the possible forms of social organization. (Urchin 112-113) 
Gould demonstrates an admirable ability to admit points of concurrence with the argu-
ments of his rhetorical opponents, eschewing absolute rhetorical dichotomies and over-
simplifications. To Gould, nature is above all a flexible and wonderfully complex 
phenomenon: "I rejoice in the multifariousness of nature and leave the chimera of 
certainty to politicians and preachers" (Ever Since 271). 
As always, Gould's sensitive nose for the a priori conclusion makes him wary of 
oversimplification: "To substitute biology for history in the absence of evidence requires 
an a priori faith that genetic explanations are, in some ultimate sense, preferable" (Urchin 
118). This preference Gould attributes to Wilson's "old fashioned reductionism," 
a mind-frame engendered by Wilson's awareness that "hard science" can afford more 
credibility to his field than can history. Just as he did with Robert Yerkes, the Harvard 
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psychologist who struggled hard with the "Army IQ Test" to bolster scientific credibility 
for the "soft science" of psychology, Gould ascribes a sort of "science envy" to Wilson 
(Urchin 118). Wilson's strict adaptationist perspective dismisses with presumed scien-
tific objectivity Gould's more flexible view of the social / biological interrelationship. 
Darwin undeniably recognized the role of amoral physical violence in the 
struggle of individuals to survive, but Gould insists that Darwin specifically avoided the 
extrapolation of this phenomenon into the societal plain. Gould cites the following as his 
favorite moral statement by Darwin: "If the misery of the poor be caused not by the laws 
of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin" (qtd. in Dinosaur 62). 
4.3 Fighting "Science" with Science 
By most practitioners' definition (including Gould's), a shining attribute of robust, 
well-executed science is its openness to disproof by new data. But how can Gould 
reconcile such a deference to objectivity with his assertion that science is influenced by 
the sociocultural assumptions of its practitioners? Gould describes scientific break-
throughs as being neither the exclusive product of ivory tower Baconian Logical 
Positivism (inductive inference made exclusively from observable facts) nor the 
exclusive product of "Eureka! moments" of intuitive, learning-dependent, and culturally 
conditioned personal epiphany. 
Instead, he recognizes both these influences upon the "context of discovery," the 
creative realm within which important scientific ideas originate. But while the context of 
discovery permits both personal bias and objective observation to percolate unimpeded, 
Gould asserts that the validation phase of the scientific process, the "context of 
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justification," must shed its subjectivity and rely upon objective, agreed-upon standards 
of proof. 
Gould believes that, in the name of scientific honesty, scientists must acknowledge 
their own prejudices openly rather than obscure them: 
We scientists are no different from anyone else. We are passionate human beings, 
enmeshed in a web of personal and social circumstances. Our field does recognize 
canons of procedure designed to give nature the long shot of asserting herself in the 
face of such biases, but unless scientists understand their hopes and engage in 
vigorous self-scrutiny, they will not be able to sort unacknowledged preference 
from nature's weak and imperfect message. (Urchin 150) 
To Gould, the cultural context of scientific discovery is something to acknowledge and 
even embrace; the danger lay in its concealment. It is with this in mind that Gould 
revisits the work of biological determinist scientists—combing their data, notes, and 
conclusions for indications of concealed subjective bias. 
As mentioned earlier, Gould applied just such scrutiny to the work of nineteenth-
century Philadelphia physician and polygenist, Samuel Morton. Morton, again, had 
attempted to prove that skull capacity was linearly rankable according to race, with White 
European races ranking highest and Native Americans and Negroes ranking lowest. 
Gould actually obtained access to Morton's skull collection, and measured Morton's 
skulls' volumes for himself. Gould's data clearly exposed Morton's method and 
conclusions as the decidedly unscientific product of Morton's a priori conclusion about 
what the final ranking order must be ("Morton's Ranking"). 
Paul Broca's conclusions regarding brain size and weight measurements also 
described a unilinear ranking system for sexes and races. Again, Gould uses as his chief 
debunking tool the demonstration that a priori bias had penetrated into the researcher's 
context of justification. As described earlier, this penetration was patently evident in 
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Broca's circular reasoning—his confusion of his own hypothesis with indisputable fact. 
He also failed to normalize for the body size, age, weight, sex, and health status of the 
individuals whose brains he measured. 
Darwinism laid the foundation for recapitulationism, the theory that the human 
development cycle reenacts the path of evolution from ancestral species. Recapitula-
tionists like Ernst Haeckel, Carl Voigt, Louis Agassiz, Cesare Lombroso, and Herbert 
Spencer believed that different races (again, race, the fulcrum of biological determinism) 
represented different levels of advancement along a unilinear continuum culminating in 
White northeastern European males. While considering their argument discreditable 
based on its a priori premise alone, Gould is quick to write that the advance of science 
itself is responsible for recapitulationism's demise, which began near the beginning of the 
twentieth century. 
Recall Haeckel's central theory of "terminal addition," the concept that as more and 
more advanced traits were added to the end of the hypothesized human developmental 
sequence, the amount of time spent by individuals reenacting the earlier phases would 
"condense." Terminal addition and condensation assumed that advanced, "final stage" 
traits could be appended simply—like cars on freight train 	onto an existing set of traits, 
and forever perpetuated thereafter. But the close of the nineteenth century brought the 
rise of Mendelian genetics. Genetic characters, present at conception, were now known 
to be the currency of heredity. The mechanism of genetic change, mutational substitu-
tion, had been shown as affecting any point in the developmental process—not solely the 
end. Gould writes that "as long as the mechanism of heredity lay shrouded in mystery, 
recapitulationists could always postulate a convenient and purely hypothetical set of laws 
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[as they did in terminal addition and condensation] to yield the preferred results" 
(Ontogeny 202). 
As mentioned earlier, the developmental theory that supplanted recapitulation by 
1909 was paedomorphism (neoteny). Again, neoteny hypothesized that the human 
developmental sequence from embryo and fetus through infant and juvenile to adult 
actually represents a retarding and truncating of a longer developmental sequence 
followed by our ancestral species. 
Rather than retreat into submission at the deflation of recapitulation, determinists 
such as the Amsterdam anatomist Louis Bolk simply shifted their argument 180° to 
harness the flow of the strongly prevailing new theory, neoteny. To Bolk, "lower races" 
of humans had advanced too far past primate fetal form to distinguish themselves from 
the "lower" species adults from which humans evolved. "Higher races" retain key traits 
of primate fetuses, according to Bolk. 
In Ontogeny and Phylogeny, Gould refutes as overly simplistic Bolk's argument 
that modern humans (especially "higher races" of modern humans) are simply primate 
fetuses that become sexually mature. True, as demonstrated in Figure 2-1, physical 
similarities do exist between human adults and primate juveniles, including: 
• 	Flat facial shape. 
• Centrally located foramen magnum at the base of the skull 
(consistent with upright rather than "all fours" posture). 
• High relative brain weight. 
• Absence of brow ridges. 
• Forward-oriented birth canal. 
Gould strongly supports the central tenet of neoteny, which is that the superior function 
of the human brain over the primate brain is the result of our species' period of prolonged 
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infantile and juvenile dependency 	an extended growth phase during which cranial 
sutures and concomitant brain growth persist to an extent far beyond that seen in 
primates. But Gould contends that Bolk ascribed to "higher" humans an overly simplistic 
"absolute fetalization" in form, downplaying multiple subtle timing retardations that 
distinguish us from primates and subordinating the action of natural selection upon 
individual traits to a secondary role (Ontogeny 365). To Gould, individual human traits 
probably evolved separately, not as a "package deal." Gould considers Bolk to have 
produced good data, but contends that Bolk's conclusions were too imbued with race-
framed philosophical baggage to afford a credible "context of justification." 
As support for his (and Darwin's) contention that human vs. primate differences are 
more a matter of degree than of kind, Gould cites a 1975 study by M. King and C. Wilson 
comparing chimp and human polypeptides (Ontogeny 405). This protein comparison 
demonstrated over 99 percent inter-species homology, adding support to Gould's favored 
belief that we differ developmentally from chimps, gorillas, and other primates mainly 
through the action of developmental regulation and timing genes rather than "structural 
blueprint" genes. And as for genetic differences among races, he cites an analogous 
study carried out by Lewontin, demonstrating negligible genetic differences between 
human races (Flamingo 196). 
As mentioned earlier, at the start of the twentieth century the defrocking of physical 
measurement (such as Morton's craniometry) and appearance (such as Lombroso's 
"stigmata") as valid criteria for racial, ethnic, and gender ranking necessitated a 
redirection of biological determinist energies. The more abstract (and therefore more 
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intangible, elusive, and impenetrable) field of intelligence testing became the perfect new 
vehicle for determinist efforts. 
Again, in Gould's view, Alfred Binet's initial humanitarian intention that 
intelligence testing be used for "special educational triage" purposes was subverted by 
psychologists such as Goddard, Yerkes, Brigham, and Terman, who commandeered the 
concept to combat the common, pejorative perception of their discipline as a "soft 
science." Central to achieving professional credibility for psychology was the identifi-
cation of a discrete, measurable entity called "intelligence," an entity that—like mass, 
velocity, or voltage in the "hard" sciences of physics and chemistry 	could be quanti-
fiably demonstrated. But to Gould, herein lies the first of several major fallacies of 
intelligence testing: the fallacy of reification. 
Reification is the reductionistic attribution of concrete existence to an abstraction. 
A good example of reification is embodied in the famous statue of the blindfolded figure 
at the "scale of justice." How much more efficiently the criminal justice system would 
operate were Justice such a physically palpable, measurable commodity. Instead, of 
course, Justice is a complex, multifaceted abstraction requiring some of our society's 
most highly skilled (and remunerated) professionals to navigate. To Gould and like-
minded colleagues, intelligence is equally complex, equally abstract, and equally absurd 
to represent as a single, palpable, and easily measurable entity. The oversimplification 
that results from Western society's decision to do so has pigeonholed countless 
individuals into what are often tragically and unnecessarily limiting social categories 
(witness Goddard's "morons," forced sterilization, and immigration restriction law). 
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Establishing credibility for intelligence as a discrete and measurable variable (and 
for intelligence testing as a useful and productive contribution from the "not-so-soft-as-
everybody-seems-to-think" science of psychology) would require a method of validation 
readily accepted within the "hard" sciences—namely statistical mathematics. And if the 
statistics to be used were sometimes too abstruse for the average lay person to compre-
hend, all the better: popular resistance to the theory would be minimized if the awe-
inspiring "mystery" of science and mathematics could be enlisted as a shield against 
popular scrutiny. 
The statistical framework undergirding intelligence testing is factor analysis, 
a technique originally applied to mental testing in 1904 by the preeminent British 
psychologist, Charles Spearman. Factor analysis is a method of quantifying the 
magnitude and direction of correlation (synchronous change) among multiple variables. 
Correlation is best understood by first limiting the explanation to two variables: 
Consider the variables of human arm length and leg length. If arm and leg length were 
measured on a group of subjects from birth through adulthood, the results would show 
that these two variables increase in close synchrony throughout life. If a common 
quantification method for two-variable correlation, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, 
"r," were applied to this example, an r value approximating +1 (representing the strongest 
directly proportional correlation) would be achieved. In this case the actual cause of the 
correlation, the physiological process of bone growth, can be easily surmised. 
By this same method, two measurements varying in opposite directions (average 
winter temperature and average deaths from hypothermia, for example) would produce a 
negative r value. A value of -1 would represent a perfect inverse correlation. Two 
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measurements varying entirely at random (say shoe size and cholesterol level) would 
show a correlation at or near zero. Real-life correlation strengths are often ambiguous, as 
would be demonstrated by a correlation of 0.5 between human height and human weight. 
Tall people are often heavier than average, but not always; short people are often lighter 
than average, but not always. 
Gould is quick to emphasize that demonstration of correlation does not 
demonstrate causation. It would be a mistake to infer that increased arm length is 
actually causing increased leg length (or vice versa) when both of these variables may 
actually be caused by an independent factor (in this case, the human growth process) or 
even multiple independent factors. The inclination to infer causation of one positively 
correlated variable by another becomes even more attractive when the actual cause(s) 
influencing the variables is (are) not as apparent. Gould jokes that his age and the price 
of gasoline during the 1970s would have demonstrated a correlation coefficient very 
close to 1.0, but it would be quite ludicrous to conclude that either of these variables had 
any causative effect upon the other. The correlation coefficient is best interpreted as a 
statement of the percentage of one variable's variation that may be associated with 
(though not necessarily caused by) variation in another variable. 
Correlation between two variables may be visually demonstrated by graphing 
one variable on the X-axis and the other on the Y-axis, and then plotting one point for 
each test subject's measurement pair (e.g., arm length and leg length). Correlation is then 
interpreted visually by evaluating the conformity of the test group's (usually) elliptical 
cluster of points to the 45° diagonal line representing perfect positive correlation. 
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Figure 4-1. Correlation Between Two Variables. (Gould, Mismeasure 241) 
Figure 4-2. Correlation Among Three Variables. (Gould, Mismeasure 244) 
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Figure 4-1 illustrates typical cluster patterns for different correlation magnitudes of 
positive correlation between two variables. 
But nature is not so simple as to manifest itself only in pairs of two correlatable 
variables. Scientists are often concerned with complex interrelationships involving a 
larger number of variables. For three variables we can visualize three-dimensional 
extensions of the scattergraphs pictured in Figure 4-1, with that figure's two-dimensional 
ellipsoid shapes now becoming cigar and football-shaped, as shown in Figure 4-2. 
But for more than three variables, the visual metaphor of Cartesian spatial projec-
tion fails us, and multivariate factor analysis becomes necessary for clarity. Factor analy-
sis attempts to simplify such complex systems of interrelationship into fewer, more easily 
interpretable "axes" or "components," each representing a manageable and elucidating 
distillation of some aspect of the original variables' interrelationship. The "first principal 
component" is the axis that best resolves the overall interrelationship. Some information 
must necessarily be lost in this simplification process, so the sign of a useful and 
appropriately applied factor analysis, according to Gould, is that a high percentage of 
original information remains recognizable within the simplified result. Computed from a 
factored matrix of individual correlation coefficients, factor analysis to this day has been 
important and widely used in a broad array of statistical applications. It was first 
harnessed by Charles Spearman for application in intelligence testing theory. 
How are multivariate correlation statistics relevant to intelligence testing? 
Spearman observed that an individual's performance levels on tests of different, 
specialized aspects of mental performance (e.g., numerical computation, logical 
reasoning, spatial problem solving, memory skills, et al.) are often highly correlated. 
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In other words, people who scored well on one type of test often scored well on other 
types; those scoring poorly on one type often scored poorly on others. Gould contends 
that Spearman invented factor analysis in 1904 essentially as a method of inferring the 
existence of a unifying and quantifiable mental capacity that was responsible for these 
frequently observed positive correlations in mental tests: 
Since most correlation coefficients in the matrix are positive, factor analysis must 
yield a reasonably strong first principal component. Spearman calculated such a 
component indirectly in 1904 and then made the cardinal invalid inference that has 
plagued factor analysis ever since. He reified it as an "entity" and tried to give it an 
unambiguous causal interpretation. He called it g, or general intelligence and 
imagined that he had identified a unitary quality underlying all cognitive mental 
activity—a quality that could be expressed as a single number and used to rank 
people on a unilinear scale of intellectual worth. (Mismeasure 251) 
Rather than addressing the possibility that parallel performance in different skill areas 
could be the result of more generalized motivational tendencies, diversified training, 
opportunity, or environment, Spearman distilled all possible mental performance 
contributors into one discrete internal factor, g. 
To Gould, Spearman's g is indefensible for several reasons: First, the decision of 
whether a causal physical meaning may be ascribed to a group of correlations with a 
strong first principal component cannot be made based on numbers alone. In our 
example of the strong positive correlation between arm length and leg length, only our 
independent knowledge of the human physiological process of bone growth allowed us to 
infer a cause for the parallel changes observed in these two variables. Without this 
knowledge, arm length and leg length could conceivably have been attributed to two 
entirely different causes. 
Second, Gould believes that the factor analytical method used by Spearman to 
calculate g is only moderately robust, resolving only 50 to 60 percent of original mental 
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test information—too little to justify reification of all mental capacities into a single 
entity (Mismeasure 251). 
Third, the "first principal component" method is, according to Gould, only one of 
several equally valid "vector-based" methods for defining axes (components) in multi-
variable relationships. For example, Spearman might just as well have chosen to 
designate two or three different component axes representing simplified "skill clusters" 
(such as Math and Verbal related skills); Gould suggests he avoided these alternatives 
because only the first principal component method permitted the reification of g. 
Gould sees in factor analysis a valid tool for simplifying complex interrelation-
ships, but not one for the reification of abstractions or the assignment of causality: 
The temptation to reify is powerful. The idea that we have detected something 
"underlying" the external realities of a large set of correlation coefficients, 
something perhaps more real than the superficial measurements themselves, can be 
intoxicating. It is Plato's essence, the abstract, eternal reality underlying superficial 
appearances. But it is a temptation that we must resist, for it reflects an ancient 
prejudice of thought, not a truth of nature. (Mismeasure 252) 
To Gould, factor analysis harnessed for reification is yet another example of Western 
civilization's dangerously reductionistic predilections. Life and human thought are to 
him very complex, wondrous, and multifarious processes, and our species' presumption 
that these may be somehow distilled into quantifiable essences is more a testament to our 
own cognitive limits and frailties than to our analytical prowess. 
But the reification of g became essential to twentieth-century hereditarianism. 
A testament to its importance, in Gould's view, was that it motivated Cyril Burt 
Spearman's successor as psychology chair at London's University College from 1932 
to 1950—to claim the title "originator of factor analysis" for himself despite strong 
evidence of Spearman's just entitlement (Mismeasure 237). An ardent proponent of 
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factor analysis and the presumed general intelligence factor, g, Burt injected into the 
crucible what is to Gould the second major fallacy of intelligence testing—the idea that 
IQ scores are primarily innate and unchangeable. 
Burt held close to his heart the responsibility for disproving environmental 
influence in intelligence development. In this 1909 quote from the British Journal of 
Psychology, Burt cuts to the crux of twentieth-century biological determinism: 
. . . the growing belief that innate characters of the family are more potent in 
evolution than the acquired characters of the individual, the gradual apprehension 
that unsupplemented humanitarianism and philanthropy may be suspending the 
natural elimination of the unfit stocks 	these features of contemporary sociology 
make the question whether ability is inherited one of the fundamental moment. 
(qtd. in Gould, Mismeasure 275) 
As can be predicted, Burt's anti-environmentalist advocacy became the rationale for 
class / race-based sociopolitical advocacy. For what could be more welcome among 
privileged classes than "scientific proof' that the sacrifice-obliging inclination to assist 
those worse off than oneself was unfounded and even dangerous to society as a whole? 
The advised inaction would be beneficial for society and pocketbook both—a veritable 
slam dunk. 
As support for his claim that intelligence is primarily inherited, Burt reported on 
the most appropriate—and, to Burt's credit, perhaps the only appropriate 	class of 
experiment for any so-called test of "nature" vs. "nurture": studies of identical twins 
raised apart. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Burt produced several reports supporting 
the contention that the IQs of identical twins raised apart (in different environments) 
showed very high correlation—thus disproving the contention that parental upbringing 
and environment are significant influences on intelligence. In a 1966 article in the British 
Journal of Psychology, Burt states that "the correlation of monozygotic twins reared in 
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separate environments amounts to as much as 0.88," and even increases above this value 
if the twins are reared together (Burt 151). Burt's study was impressive because it 
seemed to encompass more pairs of twins than any previous study. It would also figure 
strongly as a buttressing citation in Arthur Jensen's 1969 article, "How Much Can We 
Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?" 
Regarding the use of intelligence testing in primary and secondary education, it is 
apparent that Burt epitomizes for Gould the very "brutal pessimism" that Alfred Binet 
feared so much. In a 1959 journal article, Burt contended that low test performance 
among the poor was an ineluctable consequence of inferior heredity: 
Any recent attempt to base our educational policy for the future on the assumption 
that there are no real differences, or at any rate no important differences, between 
the average intelligence of the different social classes, is not only bound to fail; it is 
likely to be fraught with disastrous consequences for the welfare of the nation as a 
whole, and at the same time to result in needless disappointments for the pupils 
concerned. The facts of genetic inequality, whether or not they conform to our 
personal wishes and ideals, are something that we cannot escape. (qtd. in Gould, 
Mismeasure 285) 
Just as the intelligence testing movement in the United States became politically manifest 
in the form of immigration restriction and forced-sterilization laws, in Britain the educa-
tional system was drastically reformed by the "Examination at 11+." From 1944 to the 
mid 1960s, due in large part to the advocacy of hereditarian theorists like Burt, Britain 
enacted this rigid IQ screening system in which the "lower-scoring 80 percent" of ten-
year-old examinees were essentially diverted into "Trades" paths and way from future 
university opportunities. Gould bemoans the countless talented youth subjected by this 
system to the "pain of hopes dashed by biological proclamation" (Mismeasure 296). 
Unfortunately for Burt's cause, however, by the 1970s most of his studies would be 
discredited as fraudulent by the observations of then Princeton psychologist Leon Kamin 
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and the investigative reporting of Oliver Gillie, medical correspondent for the London 
Times. Among other statistical anomalies, Kamin noted with puzzlement that as the 
number of twin pairs studied by Burt grew from about twenty to over fifty between 1955 
and 1966, Burt claimed that average IQ correlation between twins remained unchanged 
at "0.771"—a highly unlikely phenomenon statistically (Dorfman 1177). Gillie sug-
gested that the reported roles for two of Burt's research assistants may have been falsified 
(Gould Mismeasure 235). Similar statistical fabrications and methodological aberrations 
surfaced in other Burt studies correlating IQ between parents and children and between 
close relatives (Dorfman 1177). 
Reacting to L. S. Hearnshaw's corroboratingly incriminating biography of Burt 
(commissioned originally by Burt's sister), Gould writes that 
the very enormity and bizarreness of Burt's fakery forces us to view it not as the 
"rational" program of a devious person trying to salvage his hereditarian dogma 
when he knew the game was up (my original suspicion, I confess), but as the 
actions of sick and tortured man. (All this, of course, does not touch the deeper 
issue of why such patently manufactured data went unchallenged for so long, 
and what this will to believe implies about the basis of our hereditarian presup-
positions). (Mismeasure 236) 
To be caught perpetrating a bare-faced falsification of data is the ultimate incrimination 
of a priori bias. Clutching for the almost deifying sanction that scientific proof would 
have afforded his hereditarian ideas, Burt violated the basic tenets of scientific integrity. 
To Gould, Burt's career exemplified the danger of shared dogma masquerading as 
objectivity (Mismeasure 279). In Gould's depiction of Cyril Burt I am reminded of The 
Importance of Being Earnest (1896), in which Oscar Wilde suggests that the loudest and 
best articulated claims to honesty often originate from those with ulterior motives. 
Appearance is all, sadly, for far too many people 	deceivers and deceived alike. 
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But even theories that are subsequently disproved do matter, in their time, for the 
contingent theories and political consequences they engender. We have previously 
discussed the perpetuation of Cyril Burt's error by Arthur Jensen, whose conclusion that 
intelligence is 80 percent heritable was based on Burt's fraudulent data. The "chain of 
misinformation" originating from Cyril Burt upsets Gould, from the Singapore Prime 
Minister's desire to combat reproductive gains among his less intelligent citizens to the 
persistence of Burt's discredited twin studies within introductory genetics textbooks as 
late as 1984 (Gould, Bully 156). 
Despite what Gould considers a continuing lack of supporting data, hereditarian IQ 
theory is alive and well in the final decade of the twentieth century. Herrnstein and 
Murray's The Bell Curve embodies all the key determinist tenets in its assumptions and 
assertions that the reified g has been validated as a true and preeminent entity, that IQ 
tests measure g well, and that group IQ differences reflect—and, in fact, justify 	socio-
economic stratification within society. 
Gould, Harvard psychologist Howard Gardner, Northeastern University psycho-
logist Leon Kamin, and other scientists have found major flaws in The Bell Curve. To 
Gould, the book's argument collapses if any one of the following four premises about 
intelligence is false ("Ghosts" 16-17): 
1) it is a single, discrete mental entity, 
2) it is abstractable to a single, rankable number, "g," 
3) it is highly genetic in transmission, and 
4) it is effectively immutable throughout the life of an individual. 
Gould disputes the validity of all these premises. 
Herrnstein and Murray state early on that the rankable "g" is a well respected 
concept among intelligence scholars, and base their entire thesis on its validity. The 
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problem from Gould's perspective is that "g" is in fact a contested issue among 
intelligence researchers, and competing theories have garnered considerable support in 
the field. As mentioned earlier, Gould contends that factor analysis—the statistical 
method used to define "g" by simplifying performance data from diverse skill areas 
into one variable 	is flawed due to the inherently subjective assumptions made by its 
developer, Charles Spearman, about the nature of intelligence (Gould, "Mismeasure By 
Any" 8-9). 
One "Non-g" theory emerges from Jean Piaget's Cognitive Psychology school. 
Piaget focuses on the dynamic functional mechanisms of thought processes themselves, 
and questions whether there is any palpable and measurable intellectual entity at all. 
Another competing theory is that of Multiple Intelligences. Two variations of this theory 
have been proposed, one by Howard Gardner and the other by Yale psychologist Robert 
Sternberg (Neisser 79). Gardner argues that, in addition to the verbal, mathematical, 
logical, and spatial capabilities tested by standard IQ tests, there also exist other 
elemental abilities representative of social interpersonal, musical, and body-kinesthetic 
aptitudes, among others. Sternberg proposes a tripartite intelligence composed of 
Analytic (Academic), Creative, and Practical elements. While considering the case for 
multivariate intellectual capacities, Sternberg explores differences between "book 
knowledge" and the ability to solve real-life problems through "thinking on one's feet." 
Sternberg writes: 
Of course, a tester can always average over multiple scores. But are such averages 
revealing, or do they camouflage more than they reveal? If a person is a wonderful 
visualizer but can barely compose a sentence, and another person can write glowing 
prose but cannot begin to visualize the simplest spatial images, what do you really 
learn about these two people if they are reported to have the same IQ? (qtd. in 
Herrnstein & Murray 16) 
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Some of Sternberg's own tests of practical knowledge demonstrated better predictive 
value of job performance than IQ tests (Carey 55). 
As for intelligence being highly inheritable, Gould considers this to be the central 
fallacy of the entire hereditarian theory ("Mismeasure By Any" 5). He admits, as all Bell 
Curve critics do, that there truly does exist a 15 point (one standard deviation) difference 
between the average IQ scores of Caucasian Americans and that of African Americans. 
Gould will even grant that variation of intelligence within racial groups may very well be 
significantly heritable, but he is adamant that we are unable to infer causative reasons for 
IQ differences between racial groups. 
Gould draws a compelling analogy in asking us to imagine a historically 
undernourished South American tribe whose average height is 4 inches shorter than 
the average North American Caucasian height. Within the tribe, there will be a variation 
of tall, medium, and short people that is significantly hereditary (parents do tend to beget 
offspring of similar stature to their own). However, Gould contends that, because the 
nutritional and environmental effects are so widely different between the North American 
and tribal cultures hypothesized, we cannot draw any inferences about whether genes 
make North American Caucasians taller than the tribal group. 
Other scientists have posed similar analogies, including an intriguingly more 
complex scenario of giraffe height described by Harvard astrophysicist, David Layzer, 
in his 1972 article, "Science or Superstition." Writing in opposition to Jensen and 
Herrnstein publications of that time, Layzer argued that genetic factors and environ-
mental factors are so dynamically interrelated that they cannot be considered statistically 
independent contributors to IQ score (Layzer 662-663). He asks us to consider how 
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giraffe height is determined not only by genetics, but also by local conditions influencing 
food availability. True, the genetically taller giraffe may be able to reach more "upper 
branches" in its search for food, but if that same giraffe were reared undernourished, it 
might never have achieved its genetically determined height advantage. 
Regarding The Bell Curve's strong assertion that intelligence is essentially 
unchangeable throughout the life of the individual, critics have raised numerous counter-
examples. For example, both sides of the debate acknowledge that worldwide average IQ 
scores in all racial groups have been gradually rising since testing began in the early 
twentieth century (Flynn, "Massive" and "Mean"; Herrnstein & Murray 307-309). The 
difference, fifteen points over the past fifty years, is known as the "Flynn Effect." Since 
World War II, some developing nations have demonstrated average IQ increases of 
fifteen points, a change equal to the current gap between American Blacks and Whites 
("Mismeasure By Any" 7). Hereditarians argue that, because these rises are universal, 
they do not necessarily refute the existence of underlying group differences. 
Notwithstanding Brigham's inference that immigrants in his time were less 
intelligent than past immigrants, Brigham's own data begged the interpretation that 
increasing exposure to American culture increased immigrant test scores. Yerkes's Army 
study observation that Blacks from some northern states scored higher averages than 
Whites from some southern states was reexamined by researcher Otto Klineberg in 1935. 
Klineberg concluded that these higher northern Black IQ values were related to the length 
of time they had spent taking advantage of better schools and living conditions in the 
north (Frumkin 76). There has been evidence of strong IQ scores in poor Black children 
adopted into affluent and intellectual homes ("Mismeasure By Any" 7). 
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After controlling for IQ, blacks and Latinos have substantially 
higher probabilities than whites of being in a high-IQ occupation 
Figure 4-3. Probability of Being in a High-IQ Occupation. (Herrnstein and Murray 322) 
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To Gould, the Bell Curve argument is also unsound from a statistical perspective. 
Several critics observed that the book seems to capitalize on many lay people's inability 
to distinguish "correlation" from "causation," portraying low IQ as the cause rather than 
the effect of a wide array of social problems from poverty and crime to overpopulation. 
Buried deep in the ample appendices of this eight-hundred page work are the details of 
the correlation and regression analyses used by the authors to create numerous striking 
graphs throughout the book. The graphs ostensibly demonstrate that IQ variation closely 
correlates with variations in income, job prestige, work performance, income, criminal 
tendencies, and social problems. The graphs also attempt to demonstrate that the degree 
of correlation between family socioeconomic status and these same factors is often lower. 
Causation aside, Gould finds these correlations alone to be much weaker than the 
authors claim ("Mismeasure By Any" 11). He accuses the authors of allotting themselves 
subjective "benefits of the doubt" in calculating "goodness-of-fit" relationships from 
ambiguous or highly variable NLSY data. For example, Gould's compatriot Leon Kamin 
calls attention to a Bell Curve graphic (see Figure 4-3) seeming to indicate that, with IQ 
held constant, Blacks and Latinos have an unfair advantage in obtaining jobs requiring 
high IQ levels. The chart first lists the probabilities of any White, any Black, and any 
Latino (of the same age) obtaining a high-paying job that requires an IQ of 117. It then 
lists the probabilities among candidates having an IQ of 117. 
Kamin checked the math on the actual NLSY sample data. He determined that 
the Black and Latino numbers were estimated from a very subjectively extrapolated 
curve, and that the seemingly woefully unfair Black value of 26 percent represented only 
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0.72 actual Black people 	out of the entire population of 12,500 people studied (Kamin, 
"Lies" 94). So much for unfair advantage. 
The scholars cited heavily by Heiiiistein and Murray are strong proponents of 
g-based intelligence as a reified, measurable structure. While the Multiple Intelligence 
and Cognitive psychology theories of intelligence are introduced early on in The Bell 
Curve, it is clear that the authors reject these alternative views while embracing those of a 
cadre of race-concerned psychologists that has emerged since the 1960s. This cadre's 
members have sometimes focussed so sharply on racial differences that it seems fair for 
Gould to question the objectivity and intended purpose of their research. 
For example, J.P. Rushton has devoted considerable energy to the resurrection of 
nineteenth-century topics of scientific racism, including cranial capacity, brain weight, 
and penis size differences between Blacks and Whites (Reed 267). Richard Lynn, 
another cadre member, has edited the openly racist and pro-Nazi journal, Mankind 
Quarterly, and receives funding from The Pioneer Fund, a nativist organization with a 
eugenic orientation. According to Leon Kamin, he committed gross miscalculations, 
distortions, and misrepresentations in a 1991 report which set the average African Black 
IQ at 69 (Kamin, "Lies" 83-84). Arthur Jensen, as the group's elder statesman and 
stalwart defender of "g," has done much to emphasize what he perceives to be the 
undesirable consequences of lower Black IQ scores: higher levels of retardation, crime, 
and social ills. He also has ties to the Pioneer Fund and to Mankind Quarterly. 
In this chapter we have discussed Stephen Jay Gould's self-appointed role as 
interpreter of evolutionary science's "cognitive filter"—the conditioning process or 
"spin" that scientific knowledge (valid or invalid) undergoes prior to popular assimi- 
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lation. After exploring manifestations of this filter specifically pertinent to Darwinian 
evolutionary science, we examined the work of prominent biological determinist 
scientists and authors for adherence to principles of "good science" and to scrutinize 
the accuracy of their presentations to the general public. 
As a highly skilled writer, Gould embeds within his essays not only a user-friendly 
pedagogy of technical theory, but also a keen appreciation for (and wonderment at) the 
surrounding context and consequences of scientific knowledge and of human existence 
itself. Social consciousness and a respect for the humanities often permeate even Gould's 
most technical material. Gould harbors sobering yet paradoxically uplifting convictions 
about the role of humankind on this planet, in this universe, at this point in geological 
time. In the next chapter, we will examine Gould's humanistic arguments against 
biological determinism. 
CHAPTER 5 
WHO DO WE THINK WE ARE? 
Far from denying his own liberal disposition, Gould avows it, believing that 	in the 
name of scientific honesty—scientists must acknowledge their own prejudices. Gould 
grants freely that culture, socialization, upbringing, personal experience, intuitions, and 
predispositions play a seminal role in the formation of his own (and any scientist's) world 
view. It is the denial of one's own such prejudices (and the denial that they may be 
transcended) that Gould considers potentially insidious. 
Central to his own world view are the interpretations Gould draws about the 
"status" or "role" of our species, Homo sapiens, within the larger picture of the universe's 
"time-space continuum." Asserting that a chief danger of biological determinism lies in 
its presumptions concerning human importance, morality, and ethics, Gould's essays 
persistently confront these assumptions at multiple levels. 
5.1 	King of the Perspective Shift 
The question "Who are we?" seems important to Gould, perhaps because he considers it a 
question that science should not even pretend to answer. Gould considers entirely outside 
the purview of science such "ultimate" questions as "What is the meaning / purpose of 
life?" or "What, if any, are human responsibilities toward other humans and toward other 
species of life?" To him, these questions are best deliberated within a separate domain of 
authority or "magisterium" encompassing ethics, philosophy, and religion. Within this 
realm the factual input generated by science must be respected, but scientists cannot be 
charged with the responsibility for ethical decision-making. To Gould, intrinsic to 
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biological determinism 	and to the utilitarian sociopolitical ideology it helps to 
support 	is the transgression of science (or its interpreters) across this border into the 
proper realm of ethics, philosophy, and religion. For example, recall how in National 
Socialist Germany the perception of a scientifically validated "ladder of progress" toward 
a higher race effectively abnegated ethical responsibility among the ruling elite. 
It is seemingly to combat such encroachment of science into matters of ethics that 
Gould's essays repeatedly reinforce his own stark view of Homo sapiens as a random 
accident of nature 	a product of geological and evolutionary contingency and happen-
stance that might just as randomly have left the dinosaurs dominating earth, or precluded 
life's development here in the first place. Failing to understand or acknowledge what in 
his view is the truly random nature of our own evolution, we have in many ways become 
what he refers to as "earth's most arrogant species." The myopic overconfidence of 
human despots and egotists seems tacitly to presume biological sanction and preordi-
nation for anything from interpersonal slights to genocide. But the recognition, for 
example, that our species might not even exist were it not for the unscathed emergence 
of Pikaia, the first-known chordate genus, from the Cambrian Explosion, can elicit a sort 
of primeval humility immiscible with arrogance and inhumanity. 
Gould agrees with Sigmund Freud's assertion that scientific revolutions necessitate 
a re-ordering of our own view of ourselves 	a shattering of the pedestals of human 
arrogance. Freud cited the perspective shifts attendant with Copernicus's rejection of 
terracentrism (which had hitherto declared the earth to be the center of the universe), with 
Darwin's discovery that humans are descended from animals (not specially created), and 
(immodestly) with the advent of his own theories on the nature of the human 
94 
"subconscious." To this list Gould would add geology's discovery of the vastness of 
time. Gould asserts that while heliocentrism and psychoanalytic theory were readily 
welcomed as popular schemata, Darwinian evolution remains—even to this day 	a 
theory whose ramifications many educated humans are hesitant to acknowledge fully. 
The reason? We find it difficult and deflating to accept our genealogical closeness to 
monkeys. 
Despite fossil evidence and other proof of the mechanisms of evolution, Gould 
writes, "public perception of evolution has been so spin doctored that we have managed 
to retain an interpretation of human importance scarcely different, in many crucial 
respects, from the exalted state we occupied as the supposed products of direct creation in 
God's image" (Dinosaur 326). Gould writes that it is still too painful for many of us to 
acknowledge to ourselves that humans are truly not the crowning culmination of 
unilinearly directed progress: 
I like to summarize what I regard as the pedestal-smashing messages of 
Darwin's revolution in the following statement, which might be chanted several 
times a day, like a Hare Krishna mantra, to encourage penetration into the soul: 
Humans are not the end result of predictable evolutionary progress, but rather a 
fortuitous cosmic afterthought, a tiny little twig on the enormously arborescent 
bush of life, which, if replanted from seed, would almost surely not grow this 
twig again, or perhaps any twig with any property that we would care to call 
consciousness. . . . 
All the classic forms of evolutionary spin doctoring are designed to avoid the 
radical and unwanted consequences of this mantra. (Dinosaur 327) 
To Gould, evolution has not been a "path." It has been a fractal, chaotic, and unpredict-
able dynamic, the conception of which is both liberating and "pedestal smashing" for us. 
It is liberating in an almost Zen-like way in that while it eschews the necessity to ascribe 
any "meaning" or "direction" at all to the evolutionary process, it paradoxically can still 
evoke a sense of wonder and dignity in the history and complexity of human existence. 
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Table 5-1. Geological Time Scale for the Evolution of Life on Earth. 
Compiled from Gould (Panda and Wonderful). 
EVENT DATE 
(YEARS x 106) 
COMMENTS 
Earth's Origin -4500 By our best geological estimate. 
Earliest Life -3500 
Blue-green algal mats of simple, single-celled 
prokaryotes. Five sixths of all life occurring 
since has been single-celled. 




Origin of most complex multi-cellular animals. 
Most major phyla of invertebrate animals appear 




Fossil deposits prove that almost all radical 
evolution of life forms occurred in the Cambrian 
era, and that the magnitude of Cambrian change 









Eliminated 25 percent of all animal families on 
earth, including dinosaurs, which had dominated 


















Sun to explode +5000 
Astronomers predict that the sun will explode in 
approximately 5 billion years. 
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In Gould's view, parallel to the average person's incomplete understanding of 
Darwinian evolution is an analogous misapprehension of the breadth of geological time. 
As a master of the pedagogical analogy, Gould presents this information in his essays 
with jaw-dropping clarity. Table 5-1, "Geological Time Scale for the Evolution of Life," 
summarizes key geological and evolutionary events cited by Gould throughout his 
popular essays. His key points are that: 
1. Human existence composes an astonishingly small and recent proportion of the 
4.5 billion years that have passed since the earth's astrophysical origin. 
2. The overwhelming majority of all life forms that have ever existed on this 
planet have been single-celled prokaryotic organisms such as bacteria and blue-
green algae. Prokaryotes lived alone on our planet for 3 billion years. 
3. Few individual vertebrate species have survived longer than 10 million years; 
extinction seems to be the common fate of all animals. 
To convey the awe-inspiring sense of scale involved here, Gould employs two metaphors. 
The first, called the "cosmic clock," compresses the earth's existence proportionally into 
a single 24-hour period. Under this model, the final few seconds of that proportional day 
represent all human existence, and the final few microseconds represent the contem-
porary span of our own lives. Another compelling analogy (though less mathematically 
accurate) was coined by Mark Twain, who equated earth's age to the height of the Eiffel 
Tower (300 meters) and man's existence on the planet to the thickness of the paint at its 
pinnacle (Gould, Wonderful 45). 
Despite his view of the vastness of nature, Gould does not perceive our cosmic 
belittlement as dispiriting; he celebrates human uniqueness and power in having pro-
duced such a far-reaching impact on our world in our brief stay here. Gould stresses 
scale, perspective, and the contingent randomness of evolution to remind us that, in his 
view, "progress" is a mental construct fabricated without a realistic grasp of the true 
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breadth of nature itself 	and potentially dangerous to the extent that it is misused as a 
call to action. "Humans are here by luck of the draw, not the inevitability of life's 
direction or evolution's mechanism" (Full House 175). 
5.2 The Most Arrogant Species 
To Gould, the most insidious aspect of biological determinism lies in its complementarity 
with flaws in the human psyche. Theorists and their ideas have meager impact unless 
their ideas can percolate resonantly among the motivations and interests of lay people. 
Unfortunately, it is often to our less ennobling human motivations that determinist 
theories lend strongest support. 
Gould decries the human proclivity for self delusion, especially as contained in our 
frequent, hard-driving desire to crown our own groups as biologically superior to others. 
Whether due to nature or nurture, the human mind can be quick to dichotomize others 
into Us's and Them's relative to our family, our ethnic group, our football team, our 
company, etc. We often seem to project alienating expectations upon others based on 
their most superficial attributes, and then mistake their reflexive indignation for confir-
mation. To the extent that it motivates lay people to mentally segregate one another 
based on race and class, Herrnstein and Murray's The Bell Curve might be said to reflect 
and reinforce this common xenophobic trait in the human psyche. 
As is evident to anyone who as a child (or adult) has been derided with an epithet 
such as "stupid," names can act as incisive weapons. The very act of naming, categoriza- 
tion, or quantification—so critical to the reification precept of biological determinism 	is 
one of the strongest rhetorical weapons. Its attendant power of suggestion can be 
destructive in itself Gould quotes the utilitarian philosopher, John Stuart Mill: 
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The tendency has always been strong to believe that whatever received a name 
must be an entity or being, having an independent existence of its own. And if no 
real entity answering to the name could be found, men did not for that reason 
suppose that none existed, but imagined that it was something peculiarly abstruse 
and mysterious. (qtd. in Gould, Mismeasure 320) 
Again, as rhetorician Kenneth Burke would no doubt agree, naming can communicate a 
subtext of identity, power, and mystery that has proven highly effective in compelling 
others toward the utterer's way of thinking. Through the power of suggestion, negative 
branding can seriously impair individuals' and even groups' self esteem and drive-to- 
succeed 	sometimes tragically fulfilling the label's initially incorrect classification. 
Some Native American traditions, for example, attribute to naming a dignity-draining 
capability that can demean and exert power over others. Successful athletes recognize 
the utility of "psyching out" their opponents verbally before a contest. To Gould, the 
classifying nomenclature of determinist theory offers a psychological moat, built around 
a fortress inhabited by privileged classes, and intended to psych out those who would 
attempt entry. 
Our comforting and identity-building predilection for classifying each other into 
cubbyholes can become ingrained within cherished (but erroneous) belief systems. 
Gould suggests that time often exposes the foolishness of such cherished beliefs, and he 
quotes as an example the British physician and biologist Charles White (from his 1799 
treatise supporting a static and hierarchical "chain of being"): 
Ascending the line of gradation, we come at last to the white European; who being 
most removed from the brute creation, may on that account, be considered as the 
most beautiful of the human race. No one will doubt his superiority of intellectual 
powers; and I believe it will be found that his capacity is naturally superior also to 
that of every other man. (qtd. in Gould, Flamingo 289) 
White proceeds to describe European women as the "emblems of modesty, of delicate 
feelings, and of sense," whose "plump and snowy white hemispheres, tipt in vermillion" 
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set them above all other women (qtd. in Gould, Flamingo 290). Gould describes White 
as blinded to his own culturally anchored bias, but also as a writer who was indeed 
merely expressing and reinforcing common opinion within his own society. 
To be fair, Gould has himself been accused (recall Frank Schmidt's opening 
quotation) of pandering to common opinion among liberal egalitarian-oriented scientists 
and lay people. Perhaps, since bias appears to be a multilateral phenomenon, more 
credence should be given to the those whose perspective seems more aware of its own 
prejudices, and more willing to transcend them where need be. 
And who is not immune to the temptation of "believing what one wants to 
believe"? Evolutionary theory refuted notions of a "static chain of being." But to Gould, 
White's blindness to his own biases betrays a perennial blind spot to which all humans 
are susceptible: 
But how many of our own cherished beliefs, the ones that we never doubt because 
we think that they map nature in an obvious way, will seem centuries hence just as 
foolish and ideologically bound as the static chain of being? Should we not 
examine the logic and verisimilitude of our own deepest convictions? (Flamingo 
290) 
To Gould, the danger is a complacent disinterest in obtaining and scrutinizing corrobo-
rating evidence: "No intellectual tyrannies can be more recalcitrant than the truths that 
everybody knows and nearly no one can defend with any decent data (for who needs 
proof of anything so obvious)" (Full House 212). 
Status consciousness seems to play a strong role in garnering biological determinist 
adherents. "It's not what you are that counts," Wall Street tycoon and political patriarch, 
Joseph Kennedy, once said. "It's what people think you are" ("The Kennedy's"). This 
captures an ethos that seems to pervade much of modern, competitive society from 
schoolyards to board rooms to legislative houses. Perhaps it is in this "status 
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consciousness" context that the sanctifying effect of biological determinism—of science 
as deity—helps us so often to rationalize and condone as natural and inevitable those 
socioeconomic inequalities we may perceive around us. 
To Gould, the tragic consequence of such "natural and inevitable" logic is the 
surrender of moral responsibility and autonomy to the monolithic abstraction called 
"nature." With the facility of a literary scholar, Gould the Renaissance-Man polymath 
conveys the tragedy of such moral abnegation in his essay, "The Monster's Human 
Nature," an analysis of Mary Shelley's novel, Frankenstein (1818). Perhaps the most 
egregiously misinterpreted masterpiece of English literature (due largely to its 
bastardization by the Hollywood film industry), Shelley's Frankenstein strikes to the 
heart of universal human morality and pathos. To Gould the novel is a keenly honed 
depiction of the moral danger that the average person's continuing misapprehension of 
"nature" and "nurture" can foster. 
Readers of Shelley's book (as opposed to viewers of the 1931 film version with 
Boris Karloff) are touched by this story of an unattractive creature thrust against his will 
into a world unwilling to welcome him. Wanting, at first, nothing more than the chance 
to live, earn his own sustenance, and contribute to the welfare of his newfound commu-
nity, he is shunned and ultimately degraded to the point of violently indignant vengeance 
against all that is human. 
Gould sees in Shelley's creature a metaphor for human behavioral complexity: 
"Shelley tells us that all humans reject and even loathe the monster for a visceral reason 
of literal superficiality: his truly terrifying ugliness—a reason both heartrending in its 
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deep injustice, and profound in its biological accuracy and philosophical insight about the 
meaning of human nature" (Dinosaur 58). 
The creature's appearance, it is true, evokes in others a natural revulsion. But it is 
people's reaction to him—not his biological nature itself 	that provokes his destructive 
impulses. Gould acknowledges that our biological makeup does seem to include an 
instinctual aversion to seriously malformed humans. However, he argues that human 
consciousness has progressed 	through training, understanding, and nurture—to the 
point where the importance of treating the unattractive with civility and compassion is 
clearly manifest. Gould views Victor Frankenstein, the creature's creator,  as morally 
derelict both for failing to empathize with the creature and for neglecting to educate 
others that the creature was a dignified being worthy of community acceptance. 
To Gould, we seriously oversimplify when we attempt to attribute human 
behavioral traits exclusively to either "Nature" or "Nurture," or to discretely quanti-
fiable proportions of the two. To him, human behavioral traits develop as the result of a 
complex and unquantifiable dynamic involving both biology and environment: "Nature 
supplies general ordering rules and predispositions, but nurture shapes specific manifes-
tations over a wide range of potential outcomes" (Dinosaur 60). Inherent in parental 
"nurture," for Gould, is the moral responsibility to foster the dignity, integrity, and 
acceptance of all new life. 
In reading Gould's analysis of Frankenstein, one cannot help but analogize the 
biological determinist's ostracism of unfavored races and classes to the ostracism of 
Shelley's creature. How unlikely is it that an honest, sincere, and benevolent member of 
an unfavored race, in the presence of an unwelcoming and suspicious majority, could 
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grow indignant and destructive toward that majority? Perhaps we sometimes mistake 
the repercussions of our "Us / Them" polarizations as justifications  for them. In Gould's 
words, "the monster's misery arose from the moral failure of other humans, not from his 
own inherent and unchangeable constitution" (Dinosaur 62). 
5.3 The Gouldian Rule 
Morality is intimately entwined with our perception of nature. Consider how many moral 
/ ethical disputes employ the argument "It's only natural" as a moral justification, for 
example. The views of sociobiology theorist Edward 0. Wilson and Stephen Jay Gould 
strike an interesting contrast on the relationship between ethics and science. 
To Wilson, ethical principles such as justice and human rights are not abstract 
goals independent of human physical experience; they are human neurological functions 
enabled by our biology (Wilson, "Biological Basis"). Moral behavior issues, in his view, 
have a purely material, naturally selected origin within human evolution itself, and may 
therefore be studied empirically through science. He describes traditional Western 
theological and secular philosophical perspectives on ethics as "transcendental" for their 
common belief in some form of overarching natural law independent of human physical 
biology and experience. Of his preferred empiricism, and its conflict with 
transcendentalism, Wilson writes: 
[My] empiricist argument holds that if we explore the biological roots of moral 
behavior, and explain their material origins and biases, we should be able to fashion 
a wise and enduring ethical consensus. . . . 
The choice between transcendentalism and empiricism will be the coming 
century's version of the struggle for men's souls. Moral reasoning will either 
remain centered in idioms of theology and philosophy, where it is now, or shift 
toward science-based material analysis. Where it settles will depend on which 
world view is proved correct, or at least which is more widely perceived to be 
correct. ("Biological Basis") 
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It is interesting that Wilson sees the greatest split not between religious and secular 
interests—both of which he considers predominantly transcendentalist—but between 
transcendentalists and empiricists such as himself, who see a biological basis for 
morality. 
Gould, on the other hand, is adamant that science is not equipped to supply answers 
to moral and ethical questions. Science's only ethical roles, in his view, are to refute 
misapplied facts and to be vigilant for its own abuse. To him, morality and ethics must 
be applied from our transcending sense of humanity and social consciousness—not 
linked to any prerequisite science-based knowledge: 
As a scientist, I can refute the stated genetic rationale for Nazi evil and nonsense. 
But when I stand against Nazi policy, I must do so as everyman 	as a human 
being. For I win my right to engage moral issues by my membership in Homo 
sapiens 	a right vested in absolutely every human being who has ever graced this 
earth, and a responsibility for all who are able. (Dinosaur 318) 
While Burt, Jensen, Hermstein, and Murray seem to circumscribe moral righteousness, 
societal efficiency, and civic virtue as responsibilities best assumed by a presumed 
intellectual elite, Gould adopts a more egalitarian distribution of moral empowerment. 
To Gould, moral duty is a universal right and obligation, not an earned privilege. 
Although Gould avoids overt endorsement of a specific ethical philosophy, to me 
the conflict between biological determinism and its opponents is embedded within the 
larger conflict existing between teleological and deontological schools of ethics. A brief 
description of these opposing ethical philosophies is therefore in order. 
Teleological philosophy defines activities as Right or Wrong based on their ability 
to elicit a desired end. The most commonly designated "desired end" is personal happi-
ness. Utilitarianism, the dominant teleological theory (and the dominant philosophy 
undergirding Capitalist economic systems), defines as Right any action or policy that 
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creates maximum happiness for a maximal number of people. Its chief proponents 
include the nineteenth-century philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. 
By this philosophy, if an action enhances the well-being of the majority—albeit to the 
dissatisfaction or even detriment of a minority—that action is Right because "net societal 
satisfaction" has been increased. 
Deontological ethics, on the other hand, defines Rightness based on the nature of 
the act itself, not on any abstractly weighted computation of net good or harm for society 
members. Dictated by an act's intrinsic moral character 	and existing apart from any 
need to produce a desired end—Right transcends the needs and preferences of human 
individuals. As a proponent of deontological "formalism," the eighteenth-century 
philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that "happiness" and "pleasure" were motives too 
base to employ as the foundation for a system of ethics. Instead, he proposed the 
"categorical imperative," an absolute and reason-based moral principle that prescribes 
how people should act regardless of desired ends. The contemporary deontological 
philosopher, John Rawls, propounds "contractarianism," an ethical system concerned 
with defining the optimal social rules for constructing a fair society. 
Rawls proposes a hypothetical set of laws called the "original position," 
representing the outcome of a rationally argued debate among a founding congress of 
equal citizens. To prevent the enactment of laws favoring some citizens over others, 
Rawls proposes a restraint called the "Veil of Ignorance," under which the members of 
this founding congress do not know what their own social status will be once the law is 
enacted. An obvious consequence of this lack of information would be the enactment of 
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more truly equitable laws 	a truly "blind" justice. To protect one's own best interest 
under the Veil, one must protect all others' best interests as well. 
The ethical empiricist, Edward 0. Wilson, rejects Rawls's "Justice as Fairness" 
system as having wholly ignored human biological reality: 
While few will disagree that justice as fairness is an ideal state for disembodied 
spirits, the conception is in no way explanatory or predictive with reference to 
human beings. Consequently, it does not consider the ultimate ecological or 
genetic consequences of the rigorous prosecution of its conclusions. (Sociobiology 
642) 
Concerned about the more socialistic political implications of Rawls's philosophy, 
Wilson opposes what he sees as the tightening of social control and lowering of personal 
initiative that true fairness would require ("Biological Basis"). 
Western utilitarian philosophy's emphasis on "ends" is complemented by 
biological determinism's emphasis on directed, unilateral progress and rankability of 
human worth (and the hallowed niche it reserves for the biologically superior). The task 
of computing the net benefit of a given set of ends to society 	often necessarily a highly 
subjective process— is much facilitated by the reductionistic reification and quantifi-
cation techniques employed so skillfully by determinists. For example, we have seen 
how skull and brain measurements and IQ testing have been employed with the intent of 
providing easily interpretable gauges of different groups' societal contributions. 
Just as Kant's Categorical Imperative and Rawls's Veil of Ignorance shift focus 
away from desired ends, Stephen Jay Gould's frequent reminders about the "random, 
contingent accident" of human evolution derail the determinist view of a directed, linear 
progress culminating in the ends of human 'higher races" and intellectual elites. Gould's 
emphasis on the contingent happenstance of human evolution shifts the scientific focus 
from determinism's a priori, conclusions about human biological preeminence to a 
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perspective from which human desires and ends are removed from center stage, with 
nature providing no sanction for any human social structure. 
To Gould this "amorality of nature" disqualifies science as a potential source of 
moral / ethical validation, but (almost paradoxically) elevates each individual's sense of 
humanity to the fore as the rightful agent of moral action. Gould quotes Vernon Kellogg, 
an early twentieth-century entomologist and teacher of evolution: "Some men who call 
themselves pessimists because they cannot read good into the operations of nature forget 
that they cannot read evil. In morals the law of competition no more justifies personal, 
official, or national selfishness or brutality than the law of gravitation justifies the 
shooting of a bird" (Bully 430). As reflected in his treatment of Shelley's Frankenstein, 
the root of moral responsibility lay for Gould not in nature, but in our reaction to it. 
Gould refrains from espousing a specific ethical philosophy, perhaps for the same 
reason that practitioners of Zen Buddhism reject rationality, logic, and "good / bad" 
dualism: the recognition that the more reliant understanding becomes upon symbolism 
and interpretation, the less universally recognizable and useful that understanding 
becomes. There is for Gould, though, one ethical principle that does approach such 
universality—the perennial "Golden Rule" of treating others as one would prefer to be 
treated. On ethical philosophy, Gould writes: 
Many proposals embody the abstract majesty of a Kantian categorical imperative. 
Yet I think that we need something far more grubby and practical. We need a 
version of the most useful and ancient moral principle of all—the precept 
developed in one form or another by nearly every culture because it acts, in its 
legitimate appeal to self-interest, as a doctrine of stability based upon mutual 
respect. No one has ever improved upon the Golden rule. (Bully 18) 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
How do we most accurately characterize Stephen Jay Gould's enduring role as devil's 
advocate to popular evolutionary science? In this chapter we will explore this question 
through the eyes of some of his critics, through the examination of some unlikely 
recipients of Gould's praise and criticism and through the deeper exploration of Gould's 
crux argument against biological determinism—biological potentialism. 
6.1 The Loyal Opposition 
As is evident in the two quotations that began this thesis, Gould is not without his 
detractors. If Gould paints the determinists correctly and if the practice and popular 
dissemination of science is as culturally interlaced as he contends, such criticism 
is not at all surprising. While Gould admits that determinist movements have enlisted 
both conservative and liberal allegiances for different issues and historical contexts, it 
seems safe to claim that the majority of Gould's most vituperative critics are opposed to 
his essentially liberal ideology. To Gould, determinism is a sanctifying, rationalizing 
ideology—a conservative and homeostatic mechanism whose criticism not surprisingly 
cuts to the heart of those who would be most threatened by social change. 
Recall (professor of Human Resources) Frank Schmidt's reference on page 1 of 
this thesis to Gould's Mismeasure of Man as "merely a Marxist polemic." The word 
"Marxist" in prospering 1990s America is commonly applied (as it seems to have been in 
this case) in smugly pejorative fashion by well-situated conservatives against liberals that 
question the fairness of Western capitalistic social systems. Along with another highly 
effective rhetorical term, "politically correct," the name "Marxist" achieves a strong 
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magnitude on the rhetorical "Richter Scale." Schmidt, a professor of Human Resources 
at the University of Iowa, is cited in The Bell Curve for his statistical meta-studies of IQ's 
relationship to job performance. Because Gould and his anti-determinist colleagues have 
not disputed that aptitude testing can be an important predictor of job-specific aptitude, 
the sharp tone of Schmidt's critique suggests Gould has struck a sociopolitical nerve far 
deeper than the mere details of aptitude testing. Gould's frequent contention that the 
societal status quo is as much a function of human choices as of human biological 
capabilities is understandably abhorrent to many people (perhaps including Professor 
Schmidt) who occupy respected positions in Western society. 
In keeping with his contention that scientists must openly acknowledge their own 
ideologically formative cultural biases, Gould openly avows his own "liberal" mindset. 
He does so within the bounds of the previously discussed "context of discovery," with 
full knowledge that his ultimate scientific credibility (as demonstrated in his "context of 
justification") must eschew personal and political bias for generally accepted rigor. In a 
review of a work by fellow anti-hereditarians R. C. Lewontin, Steven Rose, and Leon 
Kamin, Gould admits a strong empathy for these words by the authors: 
We share a commitment to the prospect of the creation of a more socially just 
—a socialist—society. And we recognize that a critical science is an integral 
part of the struggle to create that society, just as we also believe that the social 
function of much of today's science is to hinder the creation of that society by 
acting to preserve the interests of the dominant class, gender, and race. (qtd. in 
Urchin 149) 
But the word "Marxist" is a loaded one for Gould. So obviously suggested as a 
rhetorical jab at his credibility, the label is not one that Gould considers accurate for 
himself. In 1995, when pressed pointedly on this subject by Scientific  American 
interviewer, John Horgan, Gould admitted that some of Marx's ideas were compatible 
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with his own--for example the idea that social change occurs not gradually but in a 
"punctuational mode, in which you accumulate small insults to the system until the 
system itself breaks." 
In keeping with his emphasis on evolutionary randomness and contingency, 
however, Gould rejects Marx's preoccupation with historical predestination and deter-
minism. In the same Horgan interview, Gould states that, like many scientists, he is 
averse to being associated with "isms," especially ones which, like Marxism, have 
become widely overextended, misinterpreted, and misapplied throughout history. For 
this same reason, late in life, Marx proclaimed himself "not a Marxist." Regardless of 
Horgan's apparent intent to force Gould into a rhetorically shaming admission, I believe 
Gould would have had no qualms about admitting Marxist allegiance if it were it true. 
Gould does praise the socialist philosopher Friedrich Engels, however, no doubt 
fueling the ire of conservative Human Resource scholars like Schmidt. For Gould, 
Engels's writing provides insights into the reason that cerebral primacy became so 
important to biological determinists. Inspired by Darwinian evolutionary theories, Engels 
hypothesized that the division of labor developed early on in human cultures as the result 
of small groups of men seizing power and forcing others to work for them. Engels's 
theory of "Head and Hand" propounded that this division of labor engendered the 
Western class system that has survived ever since 	a class system that, in Gould's words, 
encouraged an emphasis on thought as primary, dominating, and altogether more 
noble and important than the labor it supervised. . . . Cerebral primacy seemed so 
obvious and natural that it was accepted as a given, rather than recognized as a 
deep-seated social prejudice related to the class position of professional thinkers 
and their patrons. (Ever Since 212) 
This is apparently not what Frank Schmidt, promoter of intelligence testing as a predictor .  
of job performance, wants to hear. In his scathing review of the 1996 re-issue of The 
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Mismeasure of Man, Schmidt admits that nineteenth-century efforts such as Morton's 
skull measurement and Lombroso's criminal anthropology were flawed, but claims that 
contemporary intelligence testing is based on unassailable data entirely unrelated to such 
flawed physical measurements. Aside from alluding to the existence of like-mindedly 
negative reviews of Mismeasure by scholars such as Arthur Jensen and J. P. Rushton, 
however, Schmidt cites no specific studies or data. 
Tom Bethel, a media fellow at the conservative Hoover Institution, contributed the 
introductory chapter's second anti-Gould quotation, arguing that Gould is wrong to infer 
human racial equality from evolutionary history because "if anything, evolution predicts 
differentiation." Contrary to the common conservative assumption that Gould acknow-
ledges no differences between people, Gould actually concurs that there are vast differ-
ences in aptitudes among individuals of all races, and that these differences can confer 
adaptive advantages to the individuals possessing them. What Gould argues vehemently 
against, however, is the idea that significant inherent differences exist between average 
group traits. "Our races may vary little in average characters, but our individuals differ 
greatly," Gould writes in The Flamingo's Smile (197). To date, neither paleontological 
nor molecular biological proof of significant structural or functional differences between 
races has been demonstrated. 
For his attempts to exclude natural selection and adaptationism from the socio-
behavioral domain, Gould has been criticized for building his own personal "picket 
fence" around Darwinism. For example, philosophy scholar David Dennett chides Gould 
for his interpretation of Darwin, calling it just another in a "series of failed attempts in the 
struggle [within the community of evolutionary biologists] to contain Darwin's idea 
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within some acceptably 'safe' and merely partial revolution" (qtd. in Clayton). Like 
sociobiology founder Edward 0. Wilson and the British evolutionary biologist, Richard 
Dawkins, Dennett favors the belief that human morality, cognition, language, and culture 
may be the result of direct Darwinian adaptation. This opposes Gould's view, which is 
that these traits are secondary side-attributes of an advanced brain that evolved to provide 
other, more primary adaptive benefits (such as improved hunting skill, or group 
cooperation). 
In a semantical jab at liberal Darwinian interpretations such as Gould's, 
Swarthmore historian Robert Bannister contends that in its time the term "social 
Darwinism" itself was more of a rhetorical epithet—applied by liberals against anyone 
who disagreed with them—than an accurate designation of prevailing upper-class 
sentiment: 
So, by the 1880s, the phrases "struggle for existence" and "natural selection," 
as applied to society, were catchwords used by those who opposed unrestricted 
competition and the cult of individual success against those who allegedly espoused 
these values. For this reason defenders of free enterprise or individual initiative 
invoked them at their peril.. . . It is hoped that scholars, and particularly the non-
historians who continue to recite the conventional story, may at least be made 
aware of the historical distortion involved. (Bannister) 
Bannister believes social Darwinism was a myth employed then and now for rhetorical 
purposes by liberal ideologues. A highly skilled rhetorician, Bannister attempts to plant 
doubts about whether socioeconomic injustice even existed at all during the "Industrial 
Golden Age." I think back to my experience with a company president who spoke of his 
hiring process sarcastically as "renting more arms and legs." I am also reminded of 
contemporary neo-Nazi leaders who claim that the Holocaust never happened, and of 
George Orwell's 1984 (1949), wherein citizens are brainwashed with the mantra that 
today's [new] enemy is the same as yesterday's and tomorrow's. 
111 
Gould's critics—and Gould himself 	are true not only to their individual 
disciplines, but also to their own sociocultural milieux. Their "Contexts of Discovery" 
and (in the case of political commentators like Tom Bethel) their "Contexts of Criticism" 
ineluctably frame their outlooks. Since individuals often seem to confuse their own 
cultural contexts for natural inevitabilities, perhaps one of Gould's greatest contributions 
has been to demonstrate through his writing the inextricability of social, economic, 
political, and cultural influences from the work of those who proclaim objectivity and 
impartiality. 
6.2 The Well-Tempered Dissenter 
I like to apply a somewhat cynical rule of thumb in judging arguments about 
nature that also have overt social implications: When such claims imbue nature 
with just those properties that make us feel good or fuel our prejudices, be doubly 
suspicious. I am especially wary of arguments that find kindness, mutuality, 
synergism, harmony 	the very elements that we strive mightily, and so often 
unsuccessfully, to put into our own lives 	intrinsically in nature. 
Stephen Jay Gould (Bully 339) 
Gould's ability to confront nuance and ambiguity, shunning oversimplification, accents 
his appeal. Wary of people and ideas that encourage pigeonholing humans into con-
venient classifications, Gould "takes his own medicine" and is not averse to acknow-
ledging his points of agreement with rhetorical adversaries. Like the rare storekeeper 
who, when out-of-stock on our desired item, directs us to his competitor, Gould avoids 
low level rhetorical ploys—and in doing so bolsters his own credibility. For Gould, truth 
lies between the extremes: 
No simple equation can be made between social preference and biological 
commitment. We can tell no cardboard tale of hereditarian baddies relegating 
whole races, classes, and sexes to permanent biological inferiority—or of 
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environmentalist goodies extolling the irreducible worth of all humans beings. 
(Mismeasure 306-307) 
Gould describes biological determinism as insidious only if harnessed to aid a theory of 
differential worth and ranking—as it has been in the examples discussed in this thesis. 
He does not deny that heredity—along with environment—is a significant contributor to 
individual human mental capacities (though he will no doubt argue about the definition of 
intelligence). Gould is most skeptical of factor analysis, of the physical measurement of 
biological parameters for ranking, and of the simplistic reification he believes they imply. 
Though some detractors try to paint him as such, Gould is clearly not a "New Age 
airhead liberal dreamer." From his outspoken anti-creationist views (not discussed here) 
one might at first conclude that Gould was ardently anti-religious. But this is not so. 
Having established himself as one of the few evolutionary biologists promoting a peace-
ful and complementary coexistence between religion and science, Gould mounts his 
counter-crusade against irrationalism and "unthinking romanticism" instead. 
Author Jeremy Rifkin's 1984 book, Algeny (written with collaboration from 
Nicanor Perlas), exemplifies Gould's concept of unthinking romanticism. The book's 
title, Algeny (a play on the word "alchemy"), reflects Rifkin's skepticism of biotech-
nology. A perennial critic of biotechnology and genetic engineering, Rifkin used his 
book to paint biotechnology as a potentially dangerous despoiler of a biological lineages 
best left sacrosanct. To Gould, "Algeny touts itself as the manifesto of a movement to 
save nature and simple decency from the hands of impatient and rapacious science" 
(Urchin 230). 
Superficially, Rifkin seems to share Gould's perspective by painting science in 
general and biotechnology in particular as products of socially embedded motives. 
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However, to Gould, Rifkin takes this off the deep end, ignoring those noble aspects of 
science that are objective and that do have redeeming societal value: 
. . . But in Rifkin's hands, this theme becomes a caricature. Rifkin ignores 
the complex interplay of social bias with facts of nature and promotes a crude 
socioeconomic determinism that views our historical succession of biological 
world-views--from creationism to Darwinism to the new paradigm now sup-
posedly under construction—as so many simple reflections of social ideology. 
(Urchin 230-231) 
Gould decries Rifkin's contention that Darwinism itself is unsupported by evidence and 
was simply a product fabricated to undergird industrial capitalism ideologically. Gould's 
review of Algeny was highly critical of Rifkin's low opinion of science: "If Rifkin's 
argument embodies any antithesis, it is not left versus right, but romanticism, in its most 
dangerous anti-intellectual form, versus respect for knowledge and its humane employ-
ment. . . . Few campaigns are more dangerous than emotional calls for proscription rather 
than thought" (Urchin 238). Gould analogizes Rifkin's suggested restrictions on biotech-
nology with the banning of printing presses for their ability to print Mein Kampf as 
readily as Hamlet. 
Gould does not hesitate to laud what he sees as the positive attributes of those with 
whom he otherwise disagrees. Although an ardent creationist who believed that God had 
a direct and immediate hand not only in life's creation but in its revelation to himself, the 
eighteenth-century Swedish scientist Carolus Linnaeus is nonetheless well admired by 
Gould for introducing the Systema Naturae—the genealogy-based classification system 
employing "genus" and "species"—which thrives to this day. Before Linnaeus, organ-
isms were cataloged according to human-centered and artificial criteria such as 
alphabetical order and "practical importance to humans." Linnaeus's Systema Naturae 
instituted a robust, non-anthropocentric system based on genealogical similarity. To 
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Gould it heralded the critical "First Unmasking of Nature," the first pedestal-smashing 
blow to objectivity-hindering human arrogance. Darwin's evolution, in its non-
anthropocentric explanation of how different organisms arose, would become the 
"Second Unmasking" that would ultimately refute creationism. 
Even the bible-toting lawyer and politician, William Jennings Bryan, perhaps the 
early twentieth century's staunchest legal advocate of creationism, earned Gould's 
respect for Bryan's like-minded sense that Darwinism was being harnessed for purposes 
of political and social subjugation. Although Gould deplores Bryan's creationism (as 
advocated, for example, in the Scopes trial of 1925) for its irrational refusal to accept 
well-demonstrated facts of geological time and Darwinian animal genealogy, he empa-
thizes with Bryan's sincere concern for human dignity. In his 1904 book, The Prince of 
Peace, Bryan wrote: 
The Darwinian theory represents man as reaching his present perfection by the 
operation of the law of hate—the merciless law by which the strong crowd out and 
kill off the weak. If this is the law of our development then, if there is any logic 
that can bind the human mind, we shall turn backward toward the beast in propor-
tion as we substitute the law of love. I prefer to believe that love rather than hatred 
is the law of development. (qtd. in Gould, Rocks 154-155) 
Bryan had been angered by published reports from the American evolutionary scientist 
Vernon Kellogg and British commentator Benjamin Kidd about "German military ethos" 
during World War I. These authors documented from first-hand experience that German 
violence and cruelties during World War I had been fueled by German intellectuals' 
inferences of competitive struggle, racial superiority, and "might makes right" aggression 
from Darwinist theory (Bully 424-425). 
Gould admired Bryan's pacifism as well as his appeals for women's suffrage, 
the graduated income tax, child labor protections, and Philippine independence from 
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American imperialism. Gould writes, "Lord only knows, he understood precious little 
about science, and he wins no medals for logic of argument. But when he said that 
Darwinism had been widely portrayed as a defense if war, domination, and domestic 
exploitation, he was right" (Rocks 163). 
6.3 Humility and the Case for Biological Potentialism 
I hope [the ultimate effect of my work] will be one further step in the kind of 
humility that would benefit humans enormously with regard to our powers and 
possibilities on this planet. I think we want to be around for a while. We'd better 
understand that we weren't meant to be, and we don't have dominion over every-
thing, and we're not always as smart as we think. 
Stephen Jay Gould (qtd. in Krasny) 
Above all, Gould's writing implores a healthy skepticism about the nature of popularly 
disseminated scientific truth. It begs acknowledgment that scientists and their inter-
preters are not immune to social, economic, and moral biases. "Much of what we regard 
as empirically proven, or logically necessary, may only be a contingent reflection of 
transient social preferences," Gould asserts (Dinosaur 135). 
To Gould, scientists justly inspire a unique trust for their inductive and analytical 
achievements, but this trust is easily betrayed: "Many people believe that evolution 
validates this or that moral behavior because scientists have told them so. When we view 
the behavior thereby justified as either benign or harmless, we tend to look the other way, 
and give the scientist a pass for his hubris" (Rocks 164). Gould believes that lay people 
in this way often relinquish their own sense of moral responsibility to science. 
A common trait of membership in any culture is an inability to distinguish the 
"universal" or "natural" from that which is culturally determined. As a historian of 
science, Gould has spent his entire literary career demonstrating for the intelligent 
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layperson the undeniable social power and bias potential inherent in our perceptions of 
this Culture vs. Nature dichotomy. "Indian skull sizes support Manifest Destiny." "Jews 
are naturally inferior to Aryans and must be eradicated in the name of Nature." "Lower 
Black IQ scores prove racial inferiority and justify segregation." Wherever one group 
dominates another, the urge to rationalize and sanctify the status quo with "objective" 
science seems common. 
Until scrutinized, bias 	like culture—is often unperceived by its host. In Gould's 
words, "Some of [our biases] are so venerable, so reflexive, so much a part of our second 
nature that we never stop to recognize their status as social decisions with radical alterna- 
tives 	and we view them instead as given and obvious truth" (Full House 8). Gould asks 
us to think about how we think and about how our culture has molded what we think. 
Gould won't allow the rhetoric of biological determinist science 	with its "mysterious" 
and secularly sanctifying aspect—to pass undetected as rhetoric or to circumvent our 
right to reasoned, reflective thought. 
The "perspective shift"—Gould's unique talent for clearly and interestingly 
communicating the vastness of geological time and the contingent nature of human 
evolution—is a chief constituent of Gould's "anti-rhetoric vaccine." He deploys it 
repeatedly against what he sees as progress-driven utilitarian social ideologies and their 
attendant corollaries of unilinear ranking, evolution to elite human subgroups, and 
justified racial discrimination. With his perspective shifts Gould attempts to salvage a 
dignifying humility from the destructive arrogance fostered by notions of master species 
and master races. I write "dignifying humility" because I see in Gould's abandonment 
of anthropocentrism something akin to the Zen Buddhist concept of non-duality—the 
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spiritually enriching abandonment of logical (but often misleading) intellectual dichoto-
mies such as "good vs. bad" and "progressive vs. regressive." Far from viewing the 
"human accident" with dismay, Gould states that "I have always regarded it as exhila-
rating and a source of both freedom and consequent moral responsibility" (Wonderful 
291). 
To Gould the greatest danger of biological determinism is that it is a "theory of 
limits." As such, it ascribes the "controlling share" in all important formative aspects of 
individual achievement not to childhood environmental context or learning opportunities, 
but to heredity, which by definition is beyond the control of the individual. The societal 
implications of this disempowerment of the individual are weighty: Gould believes that 
under this determinist view whole ethnic groups can be weighted down with low expec-
tations, insufficient economic resources, and the general distrust of communal attempts to 
assist them. The critical performance determinants of individual self-confidence and 
perseverance 	often profoundly subservient to the power of suggestion—wither away. 
Perhaps most tragically, as in Shelley's Frankenstein, repercussions of society's "Us / 
Them" polarizations may be perceived as justifications for them. 
As an empowering alternative, Gould's espoused biological potentialism acknow-
ledges an undeniably important role for heredity as the substrate for individual human 
achievement, but embraces environmental influence as a controlling catalyst in that 
achievement's denouement. Gould readily admits that heredity often does impose upon 
individuals either debilitating limits or the potential for truly exceptional talents. But in 
his view the impact of one's physical debilities 	and the fruition or frustration of one's 
innate potential talents—are a function of environmental influence, not heredity. In a 	, 
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related comment on the determinist predilection for ranking physical measurements, 
Gould writes that "I am, somehow, less interested in the weight and convolutions of 
Einstein's brain than in the near certainty that people of equal talent have lived and died 
in cotton fields and sweatshops" (Panda 151). 
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